Written evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (LIB0013)

ANNEX A

 

PREVIOUS MATERIAL LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT

 

 

1.     On 1 December 2011 the Prime Minister made a Written Ministerial Statement on the NSA’s Review of Central Co-ordination and Lessons Learned from Libya, and placed a copy of the NSA’s review in the Libraries of both Houses, as well as publishing on the No 10 website. 

 

2.     HMG provided evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) Ninth Report of Session 2010-12 on Operations in Libya on the role of the NSC (pg 44); actions in the UN Security Council and implications for future UN actions (pg 32-33 Ev14-23).  HMG’s response to the recommendation 10 of the HCDC’s Ninth Report of Session 2010-12 on Operations in Libya (pg 6) highlights that weapon proliferation in Libya is a major challenge to regional security.

 

3.     HMG provided clarification on how the lessons from the NSA review for the handling of future conflicts have been implemented in response to the HCDC Ninth Report of Session 2010-12 on Operations in Libya (recommendation 30 pg 17).

 

4.     The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) Second Report of Session 2012-13 on British Foreign Policy and the ‘Arab Spring’ covers much of the background to the 2011 intervention and immediate aftermath (Pg 16, 27-28, 31-34, 64-70, Ev 107-114, Ev 126 and Ev 133); with further information provided in HMG’s response to the FAC Report of Session 2012-13 (Pg 5-8, pg 21-24).

 

5.     DFID evidence of July 2011 to the International Development Committee (IDC) covers assistance provided by DFID as part of the international response to the Libya crisis and DFID’s work in coordinating with other donors (Ev 12-17).

 

6.     The Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on the UK plans to train up to 2,000 Libyan Armed Forces personnel in basic infantry skills, as part of the UK’s contribution to a the multi-nation commitment to training a Libyan General Purpose Force (GPF), agreed with Libyan Prime Minister Zeidan at Lough Erne in June 2013.

 

7.     The Secretary of State for Defence made a Written Ministerial Statement on the Report into the training of the GPF at Bassingbourn Barracks 11 June to 7 November 2014 and put a copy of the Report into the House of Commons Library on 9 September.

 

8.     Mr Ellwood provided supplementary written evidence to the FAC twelfth report of session 2014-15 on British foreign policy and the ‘Arab Spring’ on cross-Mediterranean Migration (pg 1). 

 

9.     On 24 July 2015, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee launched an inquiry into the role of the UK Government in seeking compensation for the victims of IRA attacks made possible by the provision of Semtex and other weapons by the former Gaddafi regime.  The HMG response to this enquiry is being led the FCO.  Mr Ellwood gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on 16 September.

 


ANNEX B

 

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA 2011-2014

 

1.     In February 2011, in the context of the Arab Spring, long standing discontent with the Qadhafi regime in Libya erupted in protests first in Benghazi in the East of Libya, then across much of the country. In response to increasingly violent and brutal attempts by the regime to put down the protests, on 26 February the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution (UNSCR) 1970, which demanded an end to the violence and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  As the situation continued to deteriorate, and with forces loyal to Qadhafi approaching Benghazi, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1973 on 17 March 2011, authorizing member states to establish and enforce a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect civilians. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a briefing to the Council on 24 March “the international community has acted together to avert a potential large-scale crisis”.

 

2.     In support of UNSCR 1973, on 24 March NATO agreed to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya.  By the end of March 2011, NATO Operation Unified Protector had three distinct components: enforcing a no-fly zone; enforcing an arms embargo in the Mediterranean Sea; and conducting air and naval strikes against military forces involved in attacks or threatening to attack Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas.

 

3.     Fighting between forces loyal to the Qadhafi regime and local militias opposing the regime continued throughout the summer of 2011.  By the end of August, militias aligned with the National Transitional Council (NTC) which had been formed in February 2011 to provide a political focus for opposition to the regime, were largely in control of Tripoli and other cities. The NTC was not universally accepted within Libya, and in many areas local revolutionary brigades filled the power vacuum created by the removal of the Qadhafi regime. 

 

4.     On 16 September, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2009 (2011), authorising the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to assist national efforts to restore public security, promote the rule of law, foster inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, and embark on constitution-making and electoral processes. On 19 September, the UN Secretary-General appointed Ian Martin as his Special Representative (SRSG) and Head of UNSMIL.

 

5.     Forces loyal to Qadhafi held out until October in some places, particularly in Qadhafi's hometown of Sirte, where Qadhafi was eventually captured and killed on 20 October. On 27 October the UN adopted UNSCR 2016, to end NATO’s civilian-protection mandate in Libya. NATO Operation Unified Protector ended on 31 October 2011.

 

6.     By the end of 2011, a Transitional Government appointed by the NTC was in place and was engaging with the international community.  Reintegrating militias into government security forces was recognised as a critical challenge.  While some local revolutionary brigades were starting to cede authority to the Transitional Government, widespread localised fighting between rival militias highlighted the fact that, beyond opposition to Qadhafi’s regime, there was little to unite many of the revolutionary groups.

 

7.     Despite ongoing localised fighting between militias throughout the first half of 2012, on 7 July 2012 Libyans voted in the first free national election in six decades, to select members for the General National Congress (GNC). Turnout was estimated at over 60%.  The GNC was inaugurated on 8 August with a mandate to transition Libya to a permanent democratic constitution within 18 months. The main political fault line, which quickly emerged within the GNC, was between a group, dominated by Islamists, who considered themselves true revolutionaries, and those they perceived as part of the former regime.

 

8.     The major challenge facing the Government appointed by the GNC was to establish control over its territory and develop the ability to enforce its decisions.  In the second half of 2012 the security situation continued to deteriorate. There were significant conflicts in Bani-Walid (South East of Tripoli) between forces aligned to the GNC and militias accused of harbouring pro-Qadhafi elements, and in Benghazi and Derna in the East, where violent extremist groups were becoming increasingly active.  On 11 September, the US consulate Benghazi was attacked resulting in the death of US Ambassador Chris Stevens and three US diplomats.  On 12 September 2012, Tarek Mitri was appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as his Special Representative (SRSG) and Head of UNSMIL.

 

9.     Political divisions delayed the formation of a Government following the election, but by December 2012, a Government had been appointed and agreed by the GNC under Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. The Government was hampered in delivery of much of its programme by a lack of capacity and experience within the new government and its institutions, and the lack of an effective government security architecture.  As a result, the Government had little ability to provide effective civilian governance, and was forced to rely on militias for delivery of security across much of the country.  This lead to slow implementation of much of the government’s programme, further eroding their support.

 

10. Politics was also becoming more polarised between, on the one side an increasingly powerful and influential bloc dominated by Islamist groups and representatives from a number of municipalities most notably Misrata, united by their opposition to the Zeidan government and what they perceived as the continuing influence of Qadhafi era officials; and on the other traditional interest groups in the East including the professional army, and some tribal groups (the ‘Traditionalists’).  Although smaller in numbers, the Islamist dominated bloc proved adept at influencing the GNC and its work.

 

11. Following serious armed intimidation, the adoption by the GNC of the Political Isolation Law on the 5 May 2013, which disqualified anyone involved in the Qadhafi regime from the new administration, heightened divisions between the ‘Traditionalist’ and Islamist blocs.  On the security side, the reintegration of militias into government security forces stalled, and clashes between Islamist militias and the professional armed forces escalated.  Fighting in Benghazi in June and Tripoli in November resulted in significant civilian casualties.  The inability of the central government to deliver effective public services and ensure security (illustrated by the kidnapping of Zeidan from a Tripoli hotel in October 2013) resulted in a growing reliance on non-Government actors, including local and municipal councils, and militias.  By the end of the year, UNSMIL was offering political and technical advice in preparation for a national dialogue. But public confidence in the GNC remained low, and militias were emerging as an increasingly powerful political force.

 

12. In March 2014, Zeidan was voted out by the GNC and stepped down as Prime Minister.  Defence Minister, Adbullah Al Thinni, took over as interim Prime Minister.  Political tensions between the Islamist dominated bloc and Traditionalists continued to escalate throughout early 2014, and fighting between militias loosely aligned to each bloc increased.  On 16 May, a coalition of military forces aligned to the Traditionalists, launched ‘Operation Dignity’ with an attack on militia forces in Benghazi.  On 18 May, the GNC was suspended after an attack on the parliament in Tripoli.  On 25 June elections were held for the House of Representatives (HoR), the successor to the GNC.  Turnout was estimated at 18%. Despite that, given the turbulence in the country, the fact that the elections took place and went smoothly was regarded as a success.

 

13. Following the election, fighting escalated particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi.  The Islamist-dominated bloc realised they would have only small numbers in the new House and were going to lose influence.  ‘Operation Dawn’ was launched on 13 July by Misratan, Zawiya and Islamist militias trying to take back Tripoli International Airport, which was under Zintani control. The fighting escalated and spread across Tripoli.  On 14 July, UNSMIL withdrew most of its staff from Libya, due to the deteriorating security situation.  On 4 August, the newly elected HoR was forced to sit for the first time in Tobruk, rather than Tripoli.  Islamist members of the HoR did not take their seats, citing security concerns if they went to Tobruk.  The British Embassy suspended its operations in Tripoli on 5 August.  Most other diplomatic missions had already left.  On 27 August the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2174 (2014) calling for an immediate ceasefire, inclusive political dialogue and prior notice of arms transfers.  Bernardino Léon took over as SRSG and Head of UNSMIL on 1 September.

 

14. Some members of the GNC refused to accept the legitimacy of the HoR, and sought to re-establish the GNC as a rival legislative authority. The GNC established a rival government in Tripoli and a presence in government Ministries.  In November, the Libyan Supreme Court ruled that the GNC decision to call elections for the HoR was invalid, calling in to question the constitutional status of the HoR.  The re-constituted GNC held its first session on 18 November (although its original mandate had long lapsed and many of the previously elected members were replaced with unelected representatives).  Two rival Prime Ministers and governments emerged, based in Tripoli and Tobruk.  National economic infrastructure such as the Central Bank of Libya remained in Tripoli, but individuals in Tobruk sought to create parallel institutions – including appointing their own Governor.  Fighting between militias linked to the HoR and GNC continued throughout late 2014 and early 2015.

 

15. Toward the end of 2014 a number of Islamist extremist groups in North Africa, including Libya, made public statements of allegiance to ISIL.  In January 2015, 9 people, including 5 foreign nationals, were killed in a terrorist attack on an international hotel in Tripoli.  In February 2015, a group affiliated to ISIL released a video of the murder of a group of Egyptian Copts in Libya, and established a geographical foothold in Sirte.

 

16. Throughout late 2014 and 2015, UN SRSG Bernardino Léon led efforts to mediate in the conflict, bringing together five tracks of talks – political, security, municipalities, civil society and tribes.  He succeeded in bringing together factions from the HoR and GNC to discuss a framework for a possible political agreement.  After a series of rounds of talks on the political track, a provisional political agreement was initialled on 11 July 2015. On 21 September, SRSG Léon announced the final text of the proposed agreement. He is hoping get the final text agreed in order to form a Government of National Accord (GNA) by the end of October. The process has been supported by the emergence, over the spring and summer of 2015, of locally-brokered ceasefires and reconciliation initiatives in many parts of the country, particularly the East.  The majority of fighting is now isolated in Benghazi, Dernah, Sirte (all ISIL/extremist related), and in isolated areas in the south (based on tribal/resource control disputes).

 

                                                                                                                                            ANNEX C

 

STABILISATION UNIT CONTRIBUTION TO THE LIBYA CRISIS

 

1.              This note outlines the Stabilisation Unit’s (SU) role in the UK’s intervention in Libya, focussing in particular on the questions set out by the FAC inquiry regarding the “extent and effectiveness of post-conflict planning by the UK and its allies” and “the UK’s engagement with Libya in the aftermath of the fighting in 2011, including the adequacy and extent of the assistance offered by the UK bilaterally and through multilateral organisations to the transitional administration in Libya”. Details are provided of the taskings covering 89 civilian experts that the SU has recruited and deployed to support HMG policy and programme activity in Libya since 2011 at the end of this note.    

 

Initial phase and the SRT

 

2.              The SU was closely involved in policy development and initial analysis from the very beginning of the Libya crisis, bringing vital know how to early scenario planning discussions and engaging UK based Libya experts. Additional non-government staff were brought in to support the core SU Libya team, and several SU staff members were deployed to support the FCO-led missions in Malta, Cairo and then finally in Benghazi.

 

3.              The SU’s most substantive contribution during this initial phase was through its generation and deployment of the first Stabilisation Response Team (SRT) in May 2011, following NSC(L) agreement. The SRT deployed within 14 days, and included UK and international staff. The SRT provided an initial analysis of the situation in NTC controlled areas, outlining the immediate challenges and medium term political, security and economic challenges the new Libyan authorities faced.  The SRT put forward a number of broad areas for priority action, including support to civil society, the security forces and the need for the NTC to ensure sustained, legitimate leadership. A subsequent SU ‘lessons’ analysis of the SRT deployment identified various issues, including whether adequately clear objectives for the SRT were agreed and whether clear command and control arrangements were in place. The review also highlighted the sensitivities of the SRT’s handling of the final report with the Libyan interim authorities and whether the tight timelines for deployment allowed for an adequate consideration of value for money.

 

Reviews

 

4.              SU next formally engaged in September 2012, following a request for a review of HMG’s support to the Libyan police and Ministry of Interior (MoI). The review found the UK programme of support, principally delivered through two deployed police advisors, was “well regarded” and had generated “good will and access to decision makers” within the Libyan police in Tripoli. Amongst other recommendations, the review suggested the deployment of an additional two advisors (Institutional Development and Security and Justice). In November 2012, SU undertook a review of the UK’s Defence Advisory Team (DAT) (later the Defence Advisory and Training Team - DATT), which was providing support and advice to the Libyan military. It concluded that progress towards the DATs objectives of supporting the UK’s security and justice objectives had been “slow but steady”. Amongst other recommendations, the review concluded that the DAT’s existing deployments (two advisors covering Defence Reform and Explosive Ordinance Disposal) should be maintained, and that the team be supplemented by a Border Security Advisor. In April 2014, the SU’s Lessons Team reviewed the UK’s Conflict Pool/Arab Partnership Programme (excluding the Security, Justice and Defence Programme in Libya. Praising the degree to which the approach was “inclusive of departmental objectives and represent[ed] a good practice model” it suggested that overall the “level of ambition set out in the high level objectives is too high to be realistically attainable by single year, small scale projects”. Amongst other recommendations, the report argued that there was a need for a “refreshed and honest assessment of what the UK can achieve” that “should be reflected in the strategy aspirations which consequently inform programming”.

 

 

The Security, Justice and Defence programme

 

5.              Following the Prime Minister’s visit to Tripoli in February 2013 and NSC discussion, the UK significantly increased its support to the Libyan government through its £62.5m Security, Justice and Defence (SJD) programme. SU staff participated in coalition talks (hosted in Libya) to determine focal activity areas.  The SU subsequently designed and in turn led on the delivery of the initial phase of the SJD programme, which focussed on police training, prisons and the management of arms and ammunition stocks and an uplift in the deployment of UK advisors across the Libyan government and security ministries. These components of Phase 1 of SJD were delivered by SU to enable programme start up and early response and engagement to cover the initial period whilst DFID managed the procurement and contracting process to put in place the implementing partner, Cardno to deliver Phase 2.  A review undertaken by SU and FCO staff in June 2014 of Phase 1 of the SJD programme acknowledged that although it had seen “tactical successes” the deteriorating security and political situation meant that the programme’s ambitions should be significantly reduced, planning timescales extended and programme assumptions and risk analysis be revisited.  A separate ‘Phase 1’ review undertaken by SJD implementers also highlighted the impact the deteriorating situation and inherent Libyan institutional weaknesses were having on the delivery of the programme’s highly ambitious objectives. Around the time of these reviews, the programme was itself scaled down considerably as the situation continued to worsen and as UK staff were withdrawn from Tripoli.

 

Since HMG evacuation

 

6.              Since the Embassy’s evacuation, the SU has provided input to HMG policy discussions on armed groups integration and confidence and security building measures that have informed the work of the UK’s Special Envoy to Libya (Jonathan Powell).  Given the recently improved political situation in Libya and the push to secure a Libyan Government of National Accord, the SU, on behalf of DFID, is in the process of reviewing programme aspirations in order to ascertain the shape and format of the SJD programme should conditions in Libya allow for re-engagement.

 


List of SU Libya Taskings 2011-present day[1]

 

  1. Deployment of a Stabilisation Response Team (May 2011) to provide an initial analysis of the situation in National Transitional Council (NTC) controlled areas, outlining the immediate challenges and medium term political, security and economic challenges the new Libyan authorities faced (NSC)

 

  1. Review of HMG’s support to the Libyan police and Ministry of Interior (Oct 2012) (FCO)

 

  1. Recruited Deployable Civilian Experts (DCEs) in support of modest up-scaled support to the security and justice sector  (2012 to 2013) (FCO).

 

  1. Design of SJD programme (Summer 2013) (FCO) (Conflict Pool Board)

 

  1. Implementation of Phase 1 of SJD programme (October 2013-June 2014), including recruitment of ongoing posts above plus: (Conflict Pool Board)

 

  1. Review of Phase 1, SJD (July 2014) (Conflict Pool Board)

 

  1. Support to reach a political settlement (Government of National Accord) (Sept 2014) (FCO)

 

  1. Support thinking on wider support to a Government of National Accord (Non Tripoli Security planning) (2015) (FCO)

 

  1. Support to Arms and Ammunition work (Feb 2015 - ongoing) (FCO)

 

  1. A temporary Programme Manager for the SJD programme (July and Sept 2015) (DFID).

 

  1. Recruiting, sustaining and deploying advisers to EUBAM Libya (FCO)

 

  1. Scoping programmatic options at the local/municipalities level (August/Sept 2015) (DFID)

 

  1. Summarising key strategic lessons to inform future approach (August/Sept 2015) (FCO)

 

  1. Assessing the SJD programme to see if it is still fit for purpose for the future/current situation (DFID)

 

 

 


ANNEX D

 

DFID PROGRAMMES IN LIBYA 2011-15

 

This note outlines DFID’s role in the UK intervention in Libya to inform the FAC Inquiry. In particular, the note focuses on the role DFID played in planning and delivering UK assistance to Libya in the run up to and aftermath of military intervention between February and October 2011.

 

1.              Introduction: DFID’s objectives and work in Libya since 2011

 

DFID has played a significant role in the overall HMG effort in Libya since 2011 and continues to be an active member of the cross-HMG team.  The underlying objectives of DFID’s engagement fall under two main strands:  (1) to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection of the most vulnerable and (2) to promote long-term stability in Libya. 

 

DFID’s programmes have flexed to respond to the volatile security situation in Libya – since 2011, programmes have ramped up, changed approach and been suspended. Decisions have been taken as part of a cross-Whitehall approach and under ministerial direction at each stage.  

 

Three main funding instruments have been available to DFID for programming in Libya:

 

DFID’s work in Libya has covered four main sectoral areas: humanitarian including demining; security, justice and defence; economic reform and private sector development.  Again, the relative priority of these sectors has changed in line with the security situation and needs on the ground.

 

2.              Humanitarian Response

 

Objective

DFID initiated humanitarian assistance to Libya in early March 2011 in response to the deteriorating security situation.  In the first instance, support was based on emerging needs.  However, in July 2011, DFID’s Secretary of State approved a strategic framework for humanitarian assistance focused on three key areas; protection from violence; assistance for survival; and ensuring effective coordination.

 

Approach

Support included evacuation and repatriation of third country nationals; funding of medical supplies; food and non-food items to cover the urgent needs to those displaced by the fighting. Support was delivered solely through multilateral organisations (IOM, ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF and IMC) and included the provision of humanitarian advisers to coordinate and mentor the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) on humanitarian operations.  By December 2011, total UK humanitarian support to the Libya crisis had totalled £17.2 million.

 

DFID also provided support to clear unexploded remnants of war and landmines through the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).  Demining activities started in May 2011. Total support for demining totalled £1.2m.

 

DFID has been monitoring humanitarian needs on the ground closely.

 

 

Results

Key results:

 

 

 

3.              Security, Justice and Defence

 

Objective

DFID’s objectives on security, justice and defence have covered three main areas: stabilisation planning, advice on policing to the Libyan Government and, building the capacity of the Libyan Government for security, justice and defence more broadly.

 

Approach

 

a)                                                              Stabilisation planning. From the outset the National Transitional Council (NTC) made it clear that they would lead on transition planning. The Libya Contact Group, an international collective, was therefore established in April 2011 to support the NTC.  DFID’s main work on initial stabilisation was through this group.  In the early stages, DFID contributed to an assessment of stabilisation requirements in NTC-controlled areas.  This work later informed the NTC’s own Stabilisation Plan, providing a basis for future support from international donors. 

 

b)                                                             Police advice.  DFID funded a police adviser to the Libyan Ministry of Interior in November 2011, to assist on issues including the integration of revolutionary fighters in to state security structures, strategic planning of the Ministry of Interior and police training. This programme was later expanded to two advisers and ran until July 2014.

 

c)                                                              Security, justice and defence programme.  The high level of ambition set by the Prime Minister led to the development (by DFID / SU / MoD / FCO) of a new £62.5m comprehensive Security, Justice and Defence (SJD) programme, building on existing advisory support provided to Libyan institutions. The programme was designed to be delivered over 3.5 years and was approved by Ministers in July 2013. The initial phase (Oct 2013 - June 2014) was delivered by SU and funded through the Conflict Pool. DFID contracted out Phase two (May 2014 - Mar 2017) on behalf of HMG. 

 

In May 2014, the Secretary of State approved Phase 2 of the SJD Programme, to be delivered by the contractor Cardno Emerging Markets, in a consortium of five partners: Cardno Emerging Markets, Upper Quartile, WYG, KBR and Altai. The contract is worth £30,963,418, although spend to date (£2.9m) has been well below original forecasts.  The programme is funded from the Conflict Stability and Security Fund.

 

Following the evacuation of the British embassy in August 2014 and further deterioration in the security situation, activities in Phase 2 of the SJD programme were never able to properly begin. Following cross-Whitehall agreement in September 2014, the Cardno contract was significantly amended. The team was reduced to the equivalent of two full-time staff based in the UK delivering analysis and advice to support HMG and UN peacebuilding efforts.  

 

 

Results and Lessons

A review of Phase 1 of the Security Justice and Defence programme conducted in June 2014 found that steady progress had been made in terms of building relations and gaining a better understanding of the situation on the ground. Notable results were the mentoring and advising of three police station commanders, the delivery of two police points in local districts and developing training materials. 

 

More recently, the SJD programme has provided analysis and advice on matters related to security and conflict reduction in support of the UN & UK’s political settlement work. Of particular value has been the public perception survey work, which gathers data directly from Libyans to help inform HMG policy and programmes. Of the £2m CSSF 15/16 allocation, £385k has been spent to date. 

 

However, there are also some key lessons from SJD work so far in Libya:

4.              Economic support: public financial management

 

Objective

DFID’s initial objective in Libya was to ensure international financial support to the NTC for basic services. Following the stabilisation period, DFID’s support has focussed on strengthening public financial management and strengthening accountability and transparency in the use of public money.

 

Approach 

In the early stages of stabilisation, DFID provided technical expertise to the Temporary Financial Mechanism (TFM), established by the Libya Contact Group.  The TFM aimed to provide short term international financial support to the NTC for basic services.  DFID’s contribution included provision of a technical expert to work on the governance arrangements of the TFM, ensuring they were transparent and accountable.

 

Later that year, (November 2011) the NSC approved a joint DFID-HMT-FCO approach to economic recovery and reform in Libya (November 2011).  In response to this, and the Prime Minister’s direction in July 2012, DFID developed a portfolio of programmes focused on public financial management (PFM) reform and strengthening the engagement of the IMF and World Bank. These programmes were/are all managed by DFID and funded from the Arab Partnership Economic Facility. APEF spend on public financial management reform to date is approximately £4.8m.  Some programmes focus solely on Libya, while others are regional with activities in Libya and neighbouring countries.

 

Initiatives have included:

 

Results and Lessons

The difficult operating environment and political inertia hampered progress. In particular, the IMF adviser was unable to spend sufficient time in country due to security concerns and political buy-in in support of reform was weak.

 

Following the return of conflict last year, only the World Bank public financial management programme and Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) programme have continued, providing advice and training remotely. NRGI activity in Libya has since been suspended.

 

Nevertheless programmes managed to produce detailed needs assessments of the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Libya, install a pilot management information system at the Ministry of Finance, introduce a modified budget coding structure, produce a ‘PFM Charter’ outlining priority areas for reform, and train 33 Libyan government officials and 12 civil society organisations on transparent oil revenue management.

Results over 2014/15 from the World Bank programme include the training of over 80 Libyan technocrats in public financial management and public investment management, the development of public investment guidelines in Arabic, and the drafting of a technical Libyan budget for 2015 with the IMF and Libyan technocrats. 

 

Again, key lessons have been learnt:

 

 

5.              Economic Support: Private Sector Development

 

Objective

DFID’s objective for private sector development (PSD) in Libya, approved by DFID’s Secretary of State in 2012, was to increase youth employment, skills and job creation.

 

Approach

A number of proposals were approved by the APEF Board from November 2012, including:

 

Private sector programmes struggled to gain traction as the security situation deteriorated. The two projects with Mercy Corps and Spark were scaled back and ended in April 2014. The UNDP Emergency Employment Programme was cancelled in February 2014, and the DFID PSD programme was cancelled in April 2015. Total spend to date is approximately £2.4m. Additional support was also provided through the IFIs via the Deauville Transition Fund (£1.7 million)) which supported economic and private sector activity.

 

Results and Lessons

Results include the development and teaching of courses to 69 business support advisers, support to four pilot job centres to design and introduce software to match job-seekers to job vacancies, the training of 84 graduates in job skills, and the provision of business counselling to 15 SMEs.

 

A key lesson to draw from DFID’s work on private sector development in Libya, is the importance of designing programmes such that they can adapt, scale or be suspended with changing circumstances.  An additional lesson might be that a clear assessment of the political/stability risks should underpin programming if effort is not to be wasted on design and contracting programmes that must later be cancelled.

Total DFID spend in Libya

 

Libya Programme 2011-2015

Spend

Humanitarian

Humanitarian

£17,228,651

Demining

£1,267,995

Hum Total

£18,496,646

PFM

World Bank/ASI

£2,528,463

NRGI

£1,813,659

IMF

£159,402

IMF FCAS

£309,604

PFM Total

£4,811,128

PSD

PSDI Upper Quartile

£1,210,160

LTAF

£331,811

FORSA

£164,792

APEF CIF Job Creation

£763,938

PSD Total

£2,470,701

Other Economic

G8 Deauville

£1,699,634

SJD

Conflict Pool SJD

£2,866,908

Conflict Pool Police Programme

£5,128,310

SJD Total

£7,995,218

Total

£35,473,327

 

 


                                                                      ANNEX E

 

LIBYA ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

 

17. Libya is a middle income country with vast hydrocarbon wealth; the country has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, the ninth largest in the world, and a relatively small population of 6.4 million people.  Hydrocarbons account for over 65% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 95% of government revenue[2]. The ongoing instability in Libya is having a negative impact on the economy. Oil production has fallen to around a third of what it was in 2011, reducing government revenues while government expenditure on wages and subsidies continues.  The drop in production, combined with falling oil prices mean that public revenue has fallen by 60%, and GDP contracted by -24% in 2014[3].

 

18. Public expenditure remains unsustainably high: public sector salaries accounted for 54% of expenditure in 2014, and subsidies and transfers 28%[4]. The result was a fiscal deficit of 43.5% of GDP in 2014[5], which is expected to continue over the medium term. In 2014, low export earnings and a reliance on food and medicine imports resulted in a current account deficit of 30% of GDP[6]. The Central Bank of Libya is drawing down reserves to pay current expenditure and fund imports at an unsustainable rate.

 

19. Conditions for private business are extremely challenging due to the volatile political and security environment.  In 2015, Libya was ranked 188th out of 189 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report.

 

20. Socio-economic issues remain a major cause of unrest. Reforms of subsidies and the public sector are needed for long-term fiscal sustainability; however reforms are not possible in the absence of a GNA, and even with a government in place, capacity to deliver reform will be limited. There is a risk that disruption caused by reform could destabilise Libya further.  Income distribution is generally accepted to be extremely unequal.  The unemployment rate is high (around 20%), particularly for youths (over 50%)[7]. Unemployment is largely structural and will not be addressed without major growth in the private sector.  Women’s labour force participation is low.  Corruption is pervasive: Transparency International rates Libya 166st  out of 175 countries[8]. Libya does not have a coherent economic strategy or macroeconomic policy function.

 



 


ANNEX F

 

GLOSSARY

 

 

You need to check that these are actually all used in the shorter text; IRA for instance looks out of place! Also, some of these are blindingly obvious – do we still do them?

AAS-B                            Ansar Al-Sharia Benghazi terrorist group

AAS-D                            Ansar Al-Sharia Derna Terrorist group

APEF                                          Arab Partnership Economic Facility

CPS                                          Crown Prosecution Service

CSDP                                          Common Security and Defence Policy

CSSF                                          Conflict Stability and Security Fund

DAT                                          Defence Advisory Team

DATT                                          Defence Advisory Training Team

DFID                                          Department for International Development

DCE                                          Deployable Civilian Expert

DRA                                          Defence Reform Advisor

ECHO                                          The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department

EOD                                          Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EU                                          European Union

EUNAVFOR Med               EU Naval Forces Operation in the Mediterranean

FAC                                          Foreign Affairs Committee

FCO                                          Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FRONTEX                             European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation

           at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

FY                                          Financial Year

G8                                          France, Germany, Italy, UK, US, Japan, Russia, Canada

GDP                                          Gross Domestic Product

GNA                                          Government of National Accord

GNC                                          General National Congress

GPF                                          General Purpose Force

HCDC                                          House of Commons Defence Committee

HMG                                          Her Majesty’s Government

HMT                                          Her Majesty’s Treasury

HoR                                          House of Representatives

ICC                                          International Criminal Court

ICRC                                          International Committee of the Red Cross

ICT                                          Information and Communications Technology

IDC                                          International Development Committee

IDP                                          Internally Displaced Person

IMC                                          International Medical Corps

IOM                                          International Organisation for Migration

IMF                                          International Monetary Fund

ISIL                                          Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISRT                                          International Stabilisation Response Team

MAG                                          Mine Action Group

MOD                                          Ministry of Defence

MOI                                          Ministry of the Interior

NATO                                          North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NSA                                          National Security Adviser

NSC                            National Security Council (Ministerial-level meeting)

NTC                                          National Transitional Council

OCHA                                          UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PFM                                          Public financial management

PSD                                          Private sector development

SJD                                          Security, Justice and Defence Programme

SME                                          Small Medium Enterprise

SRSG                                          UN Special Representative of the Secretary General 

SU                                          Stabilisation Unit

TFM                                          Temporary Financial Mechanism

UN                                          United Nations

UNDP                                          United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR                            United Nation Refugee Agency

UNICEF                            United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMAS                            United Nations Mine Action Service

UNSC                                          United Nations Security Council

UNSCR                            United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNSMIL                            United Nations Support Mission in Libya

WHO                                          World Health Organisation

 

 

 



ANNEX G

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  Maps produced by Geo-Innovations

20

 


[1] Commissioning HMG Department in brackets.

[2] IMF  Article IV Consultations 2013

[3] IMF World Economic Outlook 2015

[4] Central Bank of Libya

[5] IMF World Economic Outlook 2015

[6] Ibid

[7] AfDB Libya Country Re-engagement Note 2014-2016 (2014)

[8] Transparency Internationals  Corruption Perceptions Index (2014)  ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions.