



House of Commons  
Home Affairs Committee

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# New Landscape of Policing

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**Fourteenth Report of Session 2010–12**

***Volume II***

*Additional written evidence*

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## The Home Affairs Committee

The Home Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies.

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### Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Elizabeth Flood (Clerk), Joanna Dodd (Second Clerk), Sarah Petit (Committee Specialist), Eleanor Scarnell (Inquiry Manager), Darren Hackett (Senior Committee Assistant), Sheryl Dinsdale (Committee Assistant), Victoria Butt (Committee Assistant), John Graddon (Committee Support Officer) and Alex Paterson (Select Committee Media Officer).

### Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 3276; the Committee's email address is [homeaffcom@parliament.uk](mailto:homeaffcom@parliament.uk).

# List of additional written evidence

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# Written evidence

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## Written evidence submitted by West Yorkshire Police Authority

### 1.0 Introduction

1.1 We welcome the opportunity to submit evidence on the “new policing landscape” as set out in the Government’s consultation paper *Policing in the 21st Century: reconnecting police and public* and subsequently enshrined in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill (the Bill).

1.2 We also welcome the ambition of the Government’s plans to re-shape the police service and focus on outcomes for our communities.

1.3 We have submitted full responses<sup>1</sup> making clear our position on the proposals in Chapter 2 of the consultation paper, strongly opposing the plans to introduce directly-elected individuals and making suggestions for alternative models. We would hope that the Committee bears these observations in mind when receiving further evidence.

### 2.0 Further Inquiry: the “Policing Landscape”

2.1 We note the Committee’s interest in progress so far and what further steps the Government should take in driving:

- (a) more effective procurement in the police service;
- (b) the removal of unnecessary bureaucracy in the police service; and
- (c) greater collaboration between forces and other partners, from both the private and the public sectors.

2.2 Insofar as the first item is concerned: an inescapable observation on the changes to the so-called “policing landscape” is that the landscape itself will not change at all. Police force areas have fallen out of alignment with local government arrangements leaving a “landscape” that is both incongruous with, and often inexplicable to, our communities. For example the area that the policing world calls Humberside comprises East Yorkshire, Hull, North Lincolnshire and North East Lincolnshire. Humberside Police was described recently to Committee members by its Chief Constable as being “a force that doesn’t exist”.<sup>2</sup> This administrative incongruity and artificiality is not only unhelpful in progressing key strategic activity such as partnership work and collaboration; we believe it will also be another barrier to success for the proposed Police and Crime Commissioners. Put another way by the ACPO President<sup>3</sup> “how are we supposed to reorganise if we can’t reorganise?” The Government’s paper says (at para 3.16) that it “will remove barriers to a common sense approach to policing”—the lack of alignment between geographical, administrative and functional arrangements for the provision of other local public services (as further advanced in the Localism Bill) would appear to us to be one such barrier.

2.3 In relation to procurement, bureaucracy and collaboration we make the following submissions:

- 2.3.1 *Value for money*—We support the drive for better value for money in policing, the elimination of waste and bureaucracy and the provision of meaningful information to communities. However this ambition has to be considered against the other strategic pressures, principally those arising from the Comprehensive Spending Review and the attendant budget reductions for policing.
- 2.3.2 *Bureaucracy*—Notwithstanding the absence of any working definition even within the Home Office<sup>4</sup> there are real risks in taking too simplistic an approach to “frontline” activity. In our experience much valuable police work is conducted by quiet diligent activity that is scrutinised by police authorities but unseen by the public. For example, police officers monitoring the movements of dangerous individuals such as terrorists, sex offenders and organised criminals might be sitting in front of computer terminals but that does not detract from the importance of their work and its impact on community safety. Similarly those involved in protecting vulnerable people, improving criminal justice processes and outcomes can make a significant difference to the effectiveness of policing services. Driving these people out into public view solely in the pursuit of conspicuity will, we submit, not necessarily represent the best use of that resource in terms of community outcomes.
- 2.3.3 *Collaboration*—This area has evolved around two specific—and sometimes mutually exclusive—strategic imperatives. The first is the need to increase the capability (individual and collective) of local police forces in response to the various “gaps” identified by HMIC;<sup>5</sup> the second is to improve efficiency and reduce cost. In the former we appear to have been far more successful than the latter.

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<sup>1</sup> Submissions to Home Office 14 September and Home Affairs Select Committee 14 October 2010 and to the Public Bill Committee 14 January 2011

<sup>2</sup> HASC meeting 22 November 2010 Cannock, Staffs

<sup>3</sup> National Collaboration Conference Coventry 22 March 2011

<sup>4</sup> Mark Hughes *The Daily Telegraph* 15 March 2011

<sup>5</sup> HMIC (July 2010) *Valuing the Police: Policing in an age of austerity*

2.4 In relation to capability/capacity we support the intent to improve and co ordinate the local response to national threat, risk and harm. We note the Bill's provisions for introducing a Strategic Policing Requirement and are encouraged by the proposals for it to replace the portmanteau concept of "protective services" and the National Policing Plan. We agree that the concept of a broadly drafted Strategic Policing Requirement should replace both the National Plan and, perhaps more importantly, the highly prescriptive approach that lay behind it, allowing discretion when balancing the competing issues of local sovereignty with nationally agreed standards. We also believe this provides a real opportunity, not only to address what is the appropriate and proportionate local contribution to the national effort (the *club v country* resourcing dilemma) but also for joining up strategic planning across wider public services such as local authorities (via Local Resilience Forums), civil contingencies and the arrangements for protection of the critical national infrastructure. We would ask the Committee to seek assurance that this collaborative opportunity will be grasped by the various government departments involved.

2.5 In relation to the second imperative for collaboration—efficiency and cost—we believe the answer must be more radical because the barriers are more stubborn. When one considers (as HMIC and the NPIA have)<sup>6</sup> the barriers to effective collaboration in the round, the solution does not seem to lie in greater evaluation or exhortation. Others (quoting Freud) have pointed to the "narcissism of small differences" being a culprit impeding real progress. As an authority that has taken an innovative strategic approach to collaboration we are only too aware of the behavioural and cultural realities of the police service and the obstacles they presented, realities that will prevail in any new landscape if all that changes is the structure. We believe that short-term parochial influences continue to outweigh strategic regional benefits in much of the collaborative planning activity between police forces and believe that parochiality is both inherent within, and encouraged by, the plans for Police and Crime Commissioners (notwithstanding any broad statutory duty "to collaborate" that will be imposed on commissioners).

2.6 Given that all police assets—including all police staff—are currently owned/employed by police authorities and given too that those authorities will be required to transfer everything to a new "home" before being abolished, there is a unique opportunity here. If, in their asset transfer schemes, police authorities were to make specific provision for collaboration and to resource collaborative programmes appropriately, this part of the landscape might see greater progress than it has hitherto. Such arrangements might take the form of transferring leases, premises, vehicles and staff to a separate legal entity specifically charged with collaborative work or setting up joint venture arrangements with others. For our part we are exploring the opportunities that might be offered by both approaches, either with other authorities/forces or with private sector partners. The timescales involved are challenging and we think Government—perhaps through the NPIA—should be encouraging and supporting the exploration of the feasibility of such ventures as a priority during the transitional period.

3.0 *What advantages/disadvantages would the new National Crime Agency (NCA) as proposed by the Government in Policing in the 21st Century, have over the existing Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)?*

3.1 We understand the need for consolidation and better "fit" in the arrangements for tackling serious organised crime on a national basis. In light of the experience of SOCA we would suggest that a critical success factor will be the relationship between the Agency and local policing services and the extent to which goals are truly shared. While the NCA is to be headed by an officer of "chief constable" rank they will not, by definition, be a chief constable of a local police force and, in this respect, the NCA's constitution will differ significantly from the—largely successful—model used in counter-terrorism where local chief constables, their police authorities and staff are fully integrated with the national infrastructure.

3.2 Further, the intended focus of the Agency is clearly one of "law enforcement", the same as SOCA, and therefore the culture is not necessarily complementary to that of local policing which, although partly concerned with law enforcement, is founded upon consensual and participative community safety, crime prevention and the protection of life and property. This feature will need to be carefully managed and monitored from the outset.

4.0 *In addition to its principal focus on tackling organised crime, what other functions should the proposed new National Crime Agency undertake on behalf of police forces?*

No response.

5.0 *What should be the governance and accountability arrangements for the proposed new National Crime Agency?*

5.1 In its consultation paper the Government promised "*robust governance and accountability arrangements*" for the NCA. We believe that, to meet that promise, any such arrangements must include a clear and meaningful role for whatever body supersedes local police authorities. This would provide one element of the essential link between local policing (where all crime, however and wherever plotted, takes place) and the wider national/international strategic response.

<sup>6</sup> Reports to the High Level Working Group 11 March 2011

5.2 We also believe that it is crucial for those making decisions around expenditure, operational activity and desired outcomes to be properly accountable to the public in a way that has been lacking both in the SOCA arrangements and those coming under the direction and control of ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters. This could be achieved by representation from local criminal justice bodies and partnerships at board level, together with the presence of independent advisors/representatives and a machinery of governance that requires information and proceedings to be made public (subject to the usual qualifications around sensitive operational matters).

6.0 *Where in the proposed new landscape would the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre best sit?*

6.1 No response.

7.0 *Which bodies should take on the functions of the National Policing Improvement Agency When it is phased out?*

7.1 We are very concerned that the considerable costs of the Agency's work will simply be transferred to local policing bodies and would urge the Committee to seek assurances that the NPIA's demise will not distribute additional involuntary financial burdens across local policing bodies that are already working within previously unimagined fiscal constraints. While some of the more operationally-focussed work of the NPIA (such as the Police National Database) will necessarily move to a lead police force/agency some of its less visible but equally valuable work is at risk of disappearing. For example the delivery of professional qualifying examinations and assessments is a key activity on which the strategic future of the police service relies. One solution—which should be considered in conjunction with the question on collaboration—would be to invite police authorities and their forces to “bid” to run certain areas of NPIA activity and for Government to assist in identifying the necessary funding and governance arrangements to get them established

8.0 *What should be the role of ACPO in the new landscape?*

8.1 We agree with the Government's conclusion that there is insufficient transparency around the current arrangements for the Association of Chief Police Officers and would invite the Committee to consider the lack of accountability that has been highlighted recently in some key national policing activity (such as counter-terrorism and public order). We support the Government's intention to find “*a governance structure which makes it [ACPO] accountable to those who fund it*” and those who have a mandate for policing. We believe that something of this significance and influence in the wider policing “landscape” requires the same level of transparency, accountability and regularity as other public bodies and would suggest that statutory status, reinforced by the Good Governance Principles,<sup>7</sup> is applied to both ACPO and any successor to the Association of Police Authorities (APA).

March 2011

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### Written evidence submitted by the Business Services Association (BSA)

The BSA—The Business Services Association—represents leading UK organisations providing business and outsourced services across the private and public sector. A list of our members is provided as an Appendix. The combined UK turnover of BSA member companies is in excess of £30 billion and members directly employ over half a million people nationwide. BSA members have a strong track record of involvement within the criminal justice sectors.

We welcome the opportunity to respond to the Home Affairs Select Committee's call for evidence on “The New Landscape of Policing.”

This submission makes the following key points:

1. Both the police service and government must show leadership, coordination and commitment in order to make lasting reforms to the police service.
2. The workforce mix of the police service should be reformed to ensure expensive warranted officers are not performing non-warranted roles.
3. The police service should scale up its collaboration with private providers.
4. Increased standardisation of procurement processes should be introduced to encourage efficiencies from greater competition.

This response focuses on both: a) increased partnering between the police service and private providers; and b) greater used of standardised/collaborative procurement, as these are the two areas in which the BSA has greatest expertise.

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<sup>7</sup> OPM and CIPFA (2004) *The Good Governance Standard for Public Services*

1. *Both the police service and government must show leadership, coordination and commitment in order to make lasting reforms to the police service*

1.1 The police service must show leadership, coordination and commitment to driving efficiency throughout the service. A recent report by the Audit Commission found that police forces have previously only adopted an ad-hoc and uncoordinated approach to improving efficiency.<sup>8</sup>

1.2 This approach will also require political leadership from the centre. Reform attempts by the previous government stressed the need for large scale reform but were patchy in their impact. In a time of fiscal constraint the coalition government must show leadership in its reform attempts. It should be noted however that the government has got off to a good start in this regard.

2. *The workforce mix of the police service should be reformed to ensure expensive warranted officers are not performing non-warranted roles*

2.1 The police service has a surfeit of warranted officers performing roles that could be done by non-warranted officers.

2.2 Warranted officers cost a significant amount more than civilians to employ—a per-person average of £55,000 per year as compared to £32,000.<sup>9</sup> This makes it inefficient to have a warranted officer performing a non-warranted role.

2.3 Warranted police officers are currently tied up with the bureaucracy of back and middle office roles. Better workforce management could free officers to concentrate on frontline duties.

2.4 A number of studies have demonstrated the potential for a revised workforce mix to make substantial savings. A recent study estimates that, across the police service, having “*the right people with the right skills...doing the right things at the right time*” could save £180 million by 2014–15.<sup>10</sup> A study by the Audit Commission has suggested that redeploying 2,700 officers to the frontline could save £150 million.<sup>11</sup>

2.5 The police service should therefore make greater use of powers provided under the Police Reform Act 2002 and increase the number of civilians deployed in back and middle office roles. This would permit increased engagement with external providers and open up opportunities for cost savings and quality improvements from competition—as exemplified below.

3. *The police service should scale up its collaboration with private providers*

3.1 A preparedness to increase the use of civilians performing roles in the police service enables greater use of external providers.

3.2 Private providers either have a track record in, or a desire to expand into, providing services such as custody suite management, police consultancy, forensic medical services, secure logistics, DNA testing and fingerprint taking.

3.3 The use of external providers to drive competition holds a number of advantages to help increase quality, reduce costs and drive innovation. The threat of exit faced by a private provider if they under-perform over the length of a contract necessitates maintained high standards.

3.4 As specialists in their field, external providers offer a wealth of experience, and can provide civilians working in the police service room to grow and develop those capabilities through a focussed career path. For an employee of a large provider which may operate a number of similar contracts across a range of policy sectors, there is greater potential for promotion. By contrast, an administrator working for an individual police force operates within an organisational silo.

3.5 Reduced opportunities for career scalability may limit the motivation and focus of such employees, and result in lower quality outcomes.

3.6 A number of studies have already demonstrated the reduced value and increased quality that external providers can offer the police service. The expanded use of “Civilian Custody Assistants” CCAs in 13 sites across the UK in 2005 revealed positive results in 11 cases.<sup>12</sup>

3.7 The use of a private provider to deliver non-warranted services to South Wales Police Force unlocked savings of £1.2 million per year. This was due to the reduced cost of employing 97 CCAs (at £2 million per year) as compared to deploying frontline police officers in those roles (which would have cost £3.2 million).

3.8 Threat of exit through competition also incentivises external providers to innovate in service they provide. For example, one provider operated and maintained a system of Portable Data Assistants (PDAs) for use by

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<sup>8</sup> Audit Commission—Sustaining value for money in the police service—2010.

<sup>9</sup> Audit Commission—Sustaining value for money in the police service—2010.

<sup>10</sup> CBI—A frontline force: Proposals for more effective policing—2010.

<sup>11</sup> Audit Commission—Sustaining value for money in the police service—2010.

<sup>12</sup> Accenture—Police workforce modernisation: Impact assessments of changes to the workforce mix—2006.

frontline officers. This enabled officers to make routine enquiries remotely to their host station in order to save time.<sup>13</sup>

#### 4. Increased standardisation of procurement processes should be introduced to encourage efficiencies from greater competition

4.1 The failure of the UK's 43 police forces to rationalise as planned, in 2006, means that goods and services are still procured in a fragmented way. This is despite the reality that much of the equipment and services used by police forces across the country is the same.

4.2 Fragmentation militates against efficiency by preventing economies of scale. A number of studies have reflected the potential for collaboration and standardisation to deliver savings. For example, the Home Office acknowledges the benefits of collaborative procurement and has previously identified potential savings of £400 million through improved IT procurement across England and Wales.<sup>14</sup>

4.3 The coalition government has already taken steps to promote the use of standardised specifications for goods and services, and collaborative procurement. This is a welcome development.<sup>15</sup>

4.4 Greater standardisation and collaboration can encourage a more dynamic market in the provision of police services and promote efficiencies through competition, as currently, "*the scale of procurement run by individual forces makes bidding (to provide those services) uneconomical.*"<sup>16</sup>

March 2011

## APPENDIX

### BSA MEMBERS

#### FULL MEMBERS

Amey	<a href="http://www.amey.co.uk">www.amey.co.uk</a>
ARAMARK	<a href="http://www.aramark.co.uk">www.aramark.co.uk</a>
Babcock Infrastructure Services	<a href="http://www.babcock.co.uk">www.babcock.co.uk</a>
Balfour Beatty	<a href="http://www.balfourbeatty.com">www.balfourbeatty.com</a>
Berendsen plc	<a href="http://www.berendsen.com">www.berendsen.com</a>
Capita	<a href="http://www.capita.co.uk">www.capita.co.uk</a>
Carillion plc	<a href="http://www.carillionplc.com">www.carillionplc.com</a>
ClearSprings	<a href="http://www.clearsprings.co.uk">www.clearsprings.co.uk</a>
Compass Group	<a href="http://www.compass-group.com">www.compass-group.com</a>
Ecovert FM	<a href="http://www.ecovertfm.co.uk">www.ecovertfm.co.uk</a>
Enterprise	<a href="http://www.enterprise.plc.uk">www.enterprise.plc.uk</a>
G4S	<a href="http://www.g4s.com">www.g4s.com</a>
Interserve	<a href="http://www.interserve.com">www.interserve.com</a>
ISS UK	<a href="http://www.uk.issworld.com">www.uk.issworld.com</a>
John Laing	<a href="http://www.laing.com">www.laing.com</a>
Kier	<a href="http://www.kier.co.uk">www.kier.co.uk</a>
MITIE Group	<a href="http://www.mitie.co.uk">www.mitie.co.uk</a>
Morrison Facilities Services Ltd	<a href="http://www.morrisonplc.com">www.morrisonplc.com</a>
OCS Group	<a href="http://www.ocs.co.uk">www.ocs.co.uk</a>
Pinnacle	<a href="http://www.pinnacle-psg.com">www.pinnacle-psg.com</a>
Rentokil Initial	<a href="http://www.rentokil-initial.com">www.rentokil-initial.com</a>
Serco Group	<a href="http://www.serco.com">www.serco.com</a>
Sodexo	<a href="http://www.sodexo.com">www.sodexo.com</a>

#### ASSOCIATE MEMBERS

3i	<a href="http://www.3i.com">www.3i.com</a>
Barclays Commercial	<a href="http://www.barclays.co.uk">www.barclays.co.uk</a>
Deloitte	<a href="http://www.deloitte.com">www.deloitte.com</a>
Grant Thornton	<a href="http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk">www.grant-thornton.co.uk</a>
Harvey Nash	<a href="http://www.harveynash.com">www.harveynash.com</a>
KPMG	<a href="http://www.kpmg.co.uk">www.kpmg.co.uk</a>
Lyceum Capital	<a href="http://www.lyceumcapital.co.uk">www.lyceumcapital.co.uk</a>
Metzger	<a href="http://www.metzger.co.uk">www.metzger.co.uk</a>
Navigant Consulting	<a href="http://www.navigantconsulting.com">www.navigantconsulting.com</a>
Pinsent Masons	<a href="http://www.pinsentmasons.com">www.pinsentmasons.com</a>
PricewaterhouseCoopers UK	<a href="http://www.pwc.co.uk">www.pwc.co.uk</a>

<sup>13</sup> Serco Institute—Making time: Freeing up frontline policing—2008.

<sup>14</sup> Home Office—Protecting the public: Supporting the police service to succeed—2009.

<sup>15</sup> Home Office—Obtaining better value for money from police procurement—July 2010.

<sup>16</sup> Audit Commission—Sustaining value for money in the police services—2010.



Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP  
Serco Institute  
Trowers & Hamlins

www.rpc.co.uk  
www.serco.com/institute  
www.trowers.com

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### Written evidence submitted by FirstCare

#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Reducing public sector absence levels has been identified as a key way of improving productivity and delivering the efficiency savings now required. Research on behalf of FirstCare has found wide discrepancies between levels of sickness absence in different police forces that cannot be attributed to differences in the nature of the police workload, with discrepancies between forces with similar demographics.
- Better management of absence within police forces could not only generate cost savings and efficiencies, but also realise workforce capacity within the existing force and mitigate effects of budget restrictions on front line services.
- The costs of absence are not readily understood by public sector organisations. This is largely attributable to the fact that the absence related costs are not separated out from the overall wage bill.
- Decisions to reduce staffing costs are taken before an understanding of what savings could be generated, and what additional capacity could be realised, through more effective workforce handling and reducing absence levels.
- Forces should be required to separate out the cost of absence, to better identify costs and incentivise forces to reduce spending on absence. High absence levels not only represent an inefficient use of limited funds but also show that staff are not being supported properly.

#### INTRODUCTION

1. One of the underlying themes of the report, *Policing in the 21st Century*, is to reduce the bureaucratic and administrative burden on forces, enabling police officers to spend more time on front line duties rather than performing backroom administrative functions, thus enhancing the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of the police.
2. As the UK's largest absence management specialist, FirstCare covers more than 120,000 employees in a wide range of large public and private sector organisations, including NHS Trusts, local authorities, train operating companies, utility companies, and retailers, working with these organisations to streamline elements of their management processes and lessen the administrative burden on management when implementing the organisation's management policy.
3. Given the direction of Government policy to enhance the efficiency and economy of the police, and the analysis of managing ill-health and long term sickness as set out in Tom Winsor's recent review of police officers' and staff remuneration and conditions, the insights that FirstCare has about absence management in the public sector may be a useful addition to the debate on how to deliver improvements in efficiency and productivity across the police.
4. With this in mind, FirstCare's comments relate to how more effective management of absence across the police force could be implemented to generate cost savings, improve workflow and realise capacity within the workforce.

#### COSTS OF ABSENCE

5. A report by the think tank Reform in April 2010 found that sickness absence is 50% higher in the public sector than the private sector: public employees take 9.7 days per year off sick, compared with 6.4 days in the private sector. Staff absence directly costs the public sector £6 billion each year and managing staff absence has been identified as a key way of improving government productivity and delivering the efficiency savings now required across government and public sector bodies.
6. Research on behalf of FirstCare has found wide discrepancies between levels of sickness absence in different police forces. Responses to Freedom of Information requests to 32 police forces in England and Wales reveal that:
  - The highest sickness absence rate (11.5 days per officer in Suffolk) is 111% higher than the lowest (5.4 days per officer in Cheshire).
  - Differences in absence cannot be attributed simply to differences in the nature of the police workload, with discrepancies between forces with similar demographics.
  - Levels of absence among civilian support staff (including PCSOs) are typically higher than among police officers.
7. Better management of absence within police forces could not only generate cost savings and efficiencies, but also realise workforce capacity within the existing force and mitigate effects of budget restrictions on front

line services. For example, from FirstCare's research, bringing absence levels in Suffolk down to the levels exhibited in Cheshire would be equivalent to providing an additional 42 officers for that force.

8. However, only a minority of public sector organisations currently take advantage of the benefits of an effective absence management service to deliver efficiencies and service improvements. Common problems with reporting, notification, sickness policy and management information often prevent public sector organisations from managing absence effectively. The cost implications of these difficulties can be mitigated and considerably reduced through the implementation of an absence management service that streamlines this process and reduces the administrative burden on management.

9. Another of the key difficulties facing public sector bodies in terms of absence management is that the costs of absence are not readily understood. This is largely attributable to the fact that the absence related costs are not separated out and identified as apart from the overall wage bill. There is often therefore no incentive for public sector organisations to tackle high levels of absence as there is no easy way to determine how much absence is costing the organisation. Consequently, decisions to reduce staffing costs are taken before an understanding of what savings could be generated, and what additional capacity could be realised, through more effective workforce handling and reducing absence levels.

#### ABSENCE MANAGEMENT: EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY

10. As mentioned above, common problems with reporting, notification, sickness policy and management information often prevent public sector organisations from managing absence effectively. These difficulties also place a considerable burden on management when implementing sickness absence policy. Applying a robust absence policy throughout an organisation can be challenging as HR teams can often have limited visibility of how accurately the sickness policy is being applied. Managers may not know when an employee has hit a trigger point or when a team member should be formally reviewed. This can lead to employees being treated inconsistently through the organisation.

11. As a consequence of how absence information is recorded, management information can be limited. Comparisons between departments and different types of employees, eg civilian support staff and police officers, are needed to understand where problem areas lie. In addition, reports need to be tailored to help to reduce administration time in other departments such as payroll. By implementing accurate reporting systems that offer visibility of absence trends, managers are able to address issues in a timely and appropriate manner, greatly reducing time spent on administration.

12. A streamlined system for notifying and reporting absence relieves managers of the administrative burden of absence reporting. Immediate notification to managers about what next steps are required by the organisation's sickness absence policy, at each stage of the reporting process, would be a useful way to facilitate the proposal made in *Policing in the 21st Century* to ensure that Force leaders keep bureaucracy to a minimum at force level.

13. As identified by the report, *Policing in the 21st Century*, collecting data is both time consuming and a costly burden that is often placed on Officers. Furthermore, often more than one recording system exists. For absence, data can be under-reported, out of date and may not be comprehensive. However, real-time reporting provides organisations with the right tools to evaluate the costs of absence, and improve them. This also ensures transparency and provides organisations with accurate data against which to measure productivity, forecast costs and benchmark progress in reducing unauthorised absence. Data is also still available to aid public accountability and policy development.

14. There were a number of conclusions reached about managing ill-health, recuperative and restrictive duties within the police force in the recent report from the independent review of police officers' and staff remuneration and conditions. These included the recommendation that forces and occupational health teams should continue to develop and improve schemes to monitor the use of long term sickness. Absence management can feed into this process.

15. Absence management is not simply about reporting staff sickness levels. In a day-one absence management system, immediate medical intervention and advice is provided from registered general nurses at the time when employees report absence. This ensures that symptoms are signposted and treated at the earliest stage and staff feel supported and helped back to Health. A consistent and coherent approach towards sickness absence increases staff morale and improves workflow, reducing the levels of officers signposted onto long term sickness. Consequently, more officers are available for frontline duties.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

16. Better management of absence within police forces could not only generate cost savings and efficiencies, but also relieve administrative burdens on management, realise workforce capacity within the existing force and mitigate effects of budget restrictions on front line services.

17. Forces should be required to separate out the cost of absence from their staff wage costs within their budgets or analysis/profit and loss statements. This would aid a better understanding of the costs of absence within forces and incentivise forces to reduce spending on absence.

18. The Government should set out mechanisms which will encourage and facilitate forces to share best practice about absence management and how services can be implemented to deliver efficiencies and improve workforce flow and capacity.

March 2011

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### Written evidence submitted by Police Authorities of Wales

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Police Authorities of Wales (PAW) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Home Affairs Select Committee's request for commentary on the emerging policing landscape. We aim to contribute a specific Welsh perspective to the discourse.

1.2 Police Authorities of Wales (PAW) is a representative body of the four Police Authorities in Wales: Gwent Police Authority, Dyfed-Powys Police Authority, North Wales Police Authority and South Wales Police Authority. The main aims of PAW are to:

- Consider and act upon issues affecting policing in Wales, particularly those that are under the control of the National Assembly for Wales.
- Maintain a broad Welsh prospectus on police matters.
- Promote and protect the interests of member Authorities.
- Seek to influence the policing agenda at a national level on behalf of Police Authorities and local communities in Wales.
- Support Police Authorities in securing efficient and effective policing services across Wales.
- Enable Police Authorities to improve.
- Promote awareness of policing needs and the role and achievements of Police Authorities.
- Uphold and champion the principles of local accountability and policing by consent.

1.3 As an overview, Police Authorities have a statutory responsibility for:

- Ensuring the police provide an efficient and effective service.
- Setting the local policing priorities based on consultation with local people.
- Managing the police budget including setting the police part of the council tax in consultation with local people.
- Recruitment of the Chief Constable and the Chief Officers.
- Monitoring police performance, holding the Chief Constable to account on behalf of the public.
- Ensuring that the Chief Constable delivers a police service that balances both national strategic priorities with the concerns of local people.
- Monitoring complaints against the police.
- Promoting equality and good relations between different groups of people. Informing people of their rights if they are stopped and searched by the police.

#### 2. PAW COMMENTARY ON THE WELSH PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Police Authorities of Wales, (Dyfed Powys, Gwent, North Wales and South Wales) wish to raise that all policing and criminal justice reform, including the proposed changes to the strategic policing delivery, will be operating in a different political landscape to England which has implications for the following:

2.2 Political governance structures—the Welsh National Assembly has refused a “Legislative Consent Order” which means that Police & Crime Panels (PCP) will not be established within Welsh Local Authorities. The Home Office (HO) has recently made amendments to the Police Reform Bill that requests Local Authorities to nominate Councillors whom the Home Secretary will appoint to Police and Crime Panels and which the Home Secretary will have responsibility for running / funding. If Local Authorities are unable to put forward Councillor nominees, the Home Secretary can select her own nominees from within that Local Authority. There is no mention within the Bill of political proportionality regarding representation on the PCP.

2.3 As the Bill amendments for a Welsh governance structure for the PCP are significantly different, it does raise questions whether an additional period of consultation would be appropriate and provide the necessary transparency for the process. PAW would also point out that a feasible and workable alternative PCP check and balance is essential otherwise the proposed arrangements would be disastrous for partnership working, precept setting and would contravene the democratically elected principles that the Government is espousing.

2.4 The HO Transition Programme Sponsorship Board has established a “Wales project” with the Chair of PAW as the APA lead and the PAW Executive Officer as APACE lead, which to date, has not met, this is extremely unfortunate as the timelines for transition work are very tight. The timelines for transition work

are very tight, particularly as on-going amendments to the Bill provide a working environment that is in a constant flux.

2.5 Member's attentions should be drawn to the report of the Communities and Culture Committee of the National Assembly for Wales entitled "The Potential Impact of the U.K. Government's Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill for Community Safety in Wales".<sup>17</sup>

The Headline Recommendation is set out below:

*"We recommend that the Welsh Government has dialogue with the UK Government to persuade it to defer introducing those aspects of the bill related to the abolition of Police Authorities, and establishment of Police Commissioners and Police Crime Panels in Wales, at least until the effectiveness of their impact in England has been assessed".*

2.6 The Bill proposals are viewed as creating a bureaucratic web of two separate corporation soles and a separate scrutiny panel which is a poor model of police governance. It would be more beneficial to have the Commissioner as part of the Panel, whose members would be jointly responsible for setting the precept and policing priorities and appointing and dismissing the Chief Constable. PAW would ask the Select Committee to reflect upon the suggestion from the National Assembly—if the City of London can continue to have a Police Authority, why not maintain a similar position in Wales?

2.7 Community Safety Partnerships are a devolved function and are under the jurisdiction of WAG and therefore have different funding mechanisms, governance structures are in flux due to the dissolution of the HO Crime Team for Wales, and there are different requirements to those in England. There is limited evidence to date that these issues are being considered. We would not want to see the well developed partnership working in Wales to be undermined or hindered by an English centric focus.

2.8 The proposed National Crime Agency is raising concerns regarding clarity on its range of functions, delivery and governance. It raises serious questions regarding the sustainability of the Welsh regional collaborative units, WECTU (Wales Extremism & Counter Terrorism Unit) & TARIAN (Regional Task Force, Regional Asset Recovery Team and the Regional Intelligence Unit). We query whether there will be centralised tasking of locally financed assets? And what impact this may have in both the short and long term? How would this affect local delivery and local monitoring requirements at force level?

2.9 The grave financial situation has to be considered. Firstly the front loaded police funding cuts at the same time as wide ranging police reform do not sit well together. There are serious operational and financial implications regarding the dissolution of the NPIA and its central services. This has to be an identified area of serious risk to continuity of business for both operational delivery and budget setting. Particularly when PAs / PCCs are expected to pick up the costs for central services that have previously been provided free of charge.

2.10 PAW has additional reservations regarding the benchmarks and timelines that the HO transition Programme Sponsorship Board is working to and the amount of change that has to effectively be managed in a relatively short period.

### 3. CONCLUSION

3.1 Police Authorities of Wales is grateful for the opportunity to comment, to the Home Affairs Select Committee on the emerging policing landscape and hope that the above is helpful. PAW would be happy, however, to elaborate or provide further information which may be of benefit. Should this be required, first contact should be made with the Police Authorities of Wales Executive Officer via the contact details below:

March 2011

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#### Written evidence submitted by Police National Legal Database (PNLD)

PNLD (Police National Legal Database) is a not for profit organisation which is owned by and sits within the West Yorkshire Police estate. It must be stressed that the views expressed within this submission are not attributable to either that force or the authority.

This submission only addresses the first two questions in relation to procurement and the taking up of functions of the NPIA.

#### ABOUT PNLD

As stated above PNLD is a not for profit organisation which provides managed services in conjunction with its technology partners PDMS to the police services of England and Wales and other sectors of the criminal justice service (CJS). These services include:

- Legal Information database and website for practitioners within the CJS.
- Creation and dissemination of Standard Offence Wordings and Codes used within the CJS.

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<sup>17</sup> [www.assemblywales.org/bus-home/bus-guide-docs-pub/bus-business-documents/bus-business-documents-doc-d.htm?act=dis&id=211272&ds=2/2011](http://www.assemblywales.org/bus-home/bus-guide-docs-pub/bus-business-documents/bus-business-documents-doc-d.htm?act=dis&id=211272&ds=2/2011)

- Police based Information FAQ database and website for the public and also for practitioners within the call handling arena of England and Wales and more recently Scotland.
- National statistics database for use by police analysts and performance managers.

These services involve close working relationships with all police forces, ACPO, NPIA and other agencies within the CJS.

PNLD currently receive no central or external funding. As a not for profit organisation, all monies received through subscriptions are fed back into development of the current products, or the creation of new ones to assist with improving efficiency and contributing to police savings.

As an organisation we feel well placed to make comment on items 1 and 2 of the requested submission. PNLD and our technology partners have dealt with and deal with procurement departments across the police service and other government departments on a regular basis. We also work with departments within the NPIA particularly in the area of Case and Custody provision.

1. *What progress has the Government made so far, and what further steps should it take, in driving:*

(a) *More effective procurement in the police service*

1.1 Even though current procurement procedures are moving ahead within the police forces of England and Wales—specifically from a regional perspective, we at PNLD feel that the different structures across the country will continue to get in the way of potential collaborative projects as evidenced by PNLD’s efforts to introduce a national recruitment advertising web site in 2009–10.

1.2 PNLD had for some time worked within a cost free collaborative agreement with such a site—“All Police Jobs”. One force agreed to pilot the use of the site and the usage and savings were presented to ACPO and Chief’s Council, APA, APACE, NPIA and the idea, in essence, was sanctioned together with the potential to take on responsibility of the “could you” site which was costing the Home Office £75k per year. However, when it came to attempting to both attract forces to the idea and move towards a procurement exercise, existing contracts and agreements, processes and procedures got in the way of moving things forward—and it is still held in abeyance.

1.3 A different experience was encountered in Scotland with the Scottish Forces where life was a lot simpler when we attracted interest in our Frequently Asked Questions database. All eight forces were engaged through a national group the process was assisted by ACPOS and the SPSA became involved at an IT level when dealing with our technology partners. The site was launched successfully, a lead force was selected different arms of the project and procurement was managed through SPSA—a lot simpler.

(b) *The removal of unnecessary bureaucracy in the police service*

1.4 Bureaucracy and record keeping will always need to exist within public service in general and the police service in particular for the following reasons:

- Evidence
- Fairness
- Transparency
- Prevention of Corruption

1.5 Strides have been taken to minimise the unnecessary face of bureaucracy through legislation (such as requirement to complete forms for stop and account etc... and I am sure this will continue in the years and months ahead. We have also seen calls for a reduction in the need for as many statistics to be collected and disseminated.

1.6 However this was countered by the recent publication at [www.police.uk](http://www.police.uk) of the crime maps. It would seem there is always an appetite for statistics and their interpretation.

1.7 The police service continues to have an obsession with audit trails and conform slavishly to processes which are there to protect the organisation(s). Evidence has been provided above re the procurement issues where common sense and an element of risk taking provided a more swift solution to a similar problem.

1.8 An element of “risk averse” procedures would assist in this regard.

(c) *Greater collaboration between forces and other partners, from both the private and the public sectors?*

1.9 Having recently attended a National Collaboration Conference held at the NPIA centre, Ryton it is apparent there is a lot of work is proceeding which embraces the concept of collaboration. Operation Athena is a perfect example to hold up to the rest of the police service.

1.10 With the advent of the dissolution of NPIA as an entity within the police service, there will be a greater need to collaborate at both a private and public level.

1.11 PNLD are a perfect example of how collaboration with other public and private bodies in providing managed services does work and could work in the future.

1.12 We work with public services such as Ministry of Justice, the Crown Prosecuting Service and other law enforcement agencies to ensure the correct use of offence wordings and codes to ensure consistency at the beginning of the criminal justice process

1.13 We work with our technical partners to ensure a delivery of service to all our differing customers within the criminal justice arena which takes the responsibility of that area of business ie ensuring information is precise, correct and what the customer needs.

1.14 Within a mutually beneficial collaborative partnership, where a not for profit organisation such as PNLD is involved it can be ensured that product development and creation will always be at the forefront of any negotiations.

1.15 Any incentives from central government or private partners will always prove beneficial and may provide further motivation.

*2. Which bodies should take on the functions of the National Policing Improvement Agency when it is phased out?*

2.1 Since its inception the NPIA has taken on responsibility for a wide variety of functions, all of which go a long way to support the police service.

2.2 It provides 20 or so what it terms “critical services” ranging from the national fingerprint database, the police national computer and the specialist operations centre together with another 200 or so support services which predominantly involve training support and some delivery.

2.3 Most of the critical services cannot be dissolved completely. The ones that require police oversight need to be identified and then moved to one of three options, the National Crime Agency (once governance is decided), ACPO or a lead force (collaboration) which has the resilience, constitution and stability to be able to support such an asset transfer—including IT infrastructure.

2.4 There are going to be some critical services which could be spun out of the public service such as DORS (Driver Training Scheme) and follow the social enterprise model.

2.5 The support services which mostly revolve around training provision need to be split into those which can be stopped completely (ie no requirement any more), those which can be delivered locally and those which can be delivered at other educational establishments.

2.6 There needs to be an overarching umbrella organisation which continues to set standards of training etc.. and devises curriculum.

2.7 There are smaller organisations in the policing/IT/Educational world which have connections within all forces (and with other agencies within law enforcement and the criminal justice arena), who are established in the world of public/private partnership and with some assistance could provide support to such an umbrella organisation.

2.8 PNLD are one such body who as has been previously explained operate as a not for profit organisation, are ideally positioned within the policing arena and already provide a variety of products for the benefit of the policing world and their partners.

2.9 They and their IT partners PDMS are well versed in the areas of collaborative and partnership working within the information handling arena and are a perfect example of where some of the smaller support services of NPIA could be taken on.

*March 2011*

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**Written evidence submitted by Professor Martin Innes, Director of the Universities’ Police Science Institute, Cardiff University**

#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This submission addresses five of the questions identified by the Committee. Cutting across the specifics of the individual answers is an assumption that in future public policing will be “smaller, smarter and sharper”. It is suggested that functions relating to the development of the police profession should be removed from ACPO and the NPIA, and assigned to a new Royal College of Policing. The College would act as a co-ordinating centre for training and research by setting the requirements and standards for actual delivery by the University sector, albeit retaining more direct responsibility for the identification and training of future chief officers. A second area of focus for the submission is upon the role of the new National Crime Agency (NCA). It is suggested that it will be important to find ways to connect the assets of the NCA and the accountability structures it is subject to, in ways that ensure it contributes to the core outcomes for the police service.

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 BACKGROUND

0.1 The Universities' Police Science Institute (UPSI) was established in 2007 as a partnership between Cardiff University, South Wales Police and the University of Glamorgan to develop an evidence-led approach to police reform. Since its inception UPSI has developed a portfolio of local, national and international activities including initial police training, police executive education, strategic research, and the provision of advice and consultancy across the policing sector. Led by Cardiff University, the Institute has been commissioned to undertake strategic research by a number of agencies, including: ACPO (Homicide Working Group); ACPO (TAM); Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary; the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism; the Economic and Social Research Council; Lancashire Constabulary; and the Safer Sutton Partnership.<sup>18</sup> This submission focuses upon five of the questions that are the focus of the Committee's inquiry.

0.2. The answers provided to these questions are underpinned by a cross-cutting assumption that in the future the provision of policing will have to be "smaller, smarter, and sharper". It will be smaller because there will be fewer police officers. As a consequence police agencies will have to better exploit their informational and human assets in smarter ways. If this is accomplished, then it will ensure that when they do intervene police do so in a "sharper" more precise fashion.

1) *Which bodies should take on the functions of the National Policing Improvement Agency when it is phased out?*

1.1 The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) was an ambitious manoeuvre to provide a steering and co-ordinating "centre-of-gravity" for the development of policing. It was though founded upon a centralising impetus that was out of kilter with the broader currents in policing towards localisation. It only ever achieved limited purchase in terms of reforming policing because of a lack of "reach down" to local delivery. Also, it was hampered by a strategic incoherence, resulting from collecting together a diverse range of functions and responsibilities spanning operational matters, expert services, systems infrastructure, and professional development (education, doctrine and knowledge development).

1.2 In the future landscape these functions should be separated out and assigned accordingly. Therefore, operational policing matters that cannot be delivered locally, for example the provision of specialist expertise, should be assigned to the National Crime Agency. National policing infrastructure—such as the networks of information and communications technologies, national databases etc should be owned and managed by the Home Office.

1.3 The professional development aspect of the police is where UPSI has identified most need for reform. There is a strong case for suggesting that the majority of education and training provision could be provided by the University sector. It seems perverse for police agencies to host their own training departments and associated infrastructure when there will be local Universities already with these resources. UPSI's experience at the University of Glamorgan was that by training police recruits alongside other public service providers the potential for improved multi-agency working was being seeded.

1.4 A similar logic pertains to research and knowledge development functions. The NPIA, as a centralised agency, operationalised a "big science" model of knowledge development, where the accent was upon policing being informed by the best available evidence. However, in pursuing this approach, insufficient attention was paid to how research evidence can become embedded within practice, in order that it shapes how police officers "do" policing. Just because there is robust and reliable research evidence available, does not automatically translate into it having a transformative impact upon service delivery.

1.5 Working in partnership with South Wales Police, UPSI has therefore been developing a different route as encapsulated in our vision statement—"evidence for the art, craft and science of policing." Adapting a "Medical School model", our approach has been based upon the notion that what is required is not just the establishment of research evidence, but a process that helps police officers to see how such evidence can routinely inform the arts and crafts that they practise in delivering services to the public. Analogous to how medical practitioners are trained in schools of medicine, this philosophy has been operationalised through a "bottom-up" approach, whereby police officers and staff are themselves encouraged to develop and use evidence to deliver services differently. Specific mechanisms for this have included:

- All SWP recruits being trained at the University of Glamorgan;
- SWP officers participating directly in data collection for University-led research projects;
- Six senior police officers and staff have been funded to take Cardiff University's Masters' in Public Administration;
- A number of other staff are enrolled taking Masters and PhD level courses;
- UPSI has run six Executive Education seminars for SWP all of which have been over-subscribed and are effectively taking the University into the police.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> More information about these projects can be accessed via [www.upsu.org.uk](http://www.upsu.org.uk).

<sup>19</sup> A more detailed account of the approach that has been developed is described in Innes, M (2010). "A mirror and a motor: Researching and reforming policing in an age of austerity", *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 4/2: 127–34.

1.6 It is appropriate to state at this juncture that despite the progress that has been made, the current funding situation in policing and in the universities have rendered this pioneering approach very precarious. If this approach were to be developed in future it would require adaptations on the part of both the policing and University sectors.

2) *What advantages/disadvantages would the new National Crime Agency, as proposed by the Government in Policing in the 21st Century, have over the existing Serious Organised Crime Agency?*

2.1 The government's proposals to date in this area are lacking in detail and have only been sketched out. As such, until greater clarity is provided, it is hard to draw conclusive answers about potential advantages / disadvantages. It is possible though to establish what problems any new arrangements need to resolve.

2.2 SOCA defined its mission as being concerned with reducing the harms of organised crime. Accordingly, a lot of its activity has been predicated upon logics of prevention and pre-emption, delivered quite often through "disruptions". A key problem encountered in this strategic approach was a lack of agreed upon metrics by which to measure progress and impact. For example, it is obviously difficult to measure the impact of a problem that has been prevented from occurring. Likewise, whilst it has been possible to establish data on the numbers and types of intervention, judging their overall efficacy in reducing harm has proven far more difficult.<sup>20</sup>

2.3 On the basis that the NCA will be a more avowedly policing agency one hopes that it will integrate better with local policing. One of the problems with SOCA was that it appeared to want to tackle all problems starting at NIM Level 3, with the assumption being that impacting upon criminal networks at this level would "trickle down" locally. However, the results of such "top down" interventions were often very hard to detect at a local level. Because the NCA is a policing agency one would anticipate that greater synergy could be achieved between its interests and interventions, and the kinds of indicators that are used to assess the impacts of local policing. This does though plug into a wider issue of concern, in that currently there is a lack of clarity about what precisely policing is being asked to deliver and how this can be measured?

2.4 In Cardiff, UPSI has been engaged in research in partnership with South Wales Police to explore how neighbourhood and more specialist policing assets can be configured and connected in ways that render them more directly responsive to community identified priorities. In 2008, a University led research project was initiated to systematically identify the public's neighbourhood security needs and priorities for policing across the South Wales area. Based upon 4,200 in-depth interviews with citizens, this work identified certain areas of Cardiff where drugs related issues were principal "drivers" of public concern. These were not in areas of the City necessarily being identified by the police's extant intelligence. Responding to these local concerns, under the auspices of Operation Michigan covert police assets were deployed to identify the actors in the drugs markets. These individuals were filmed by covert resources and Neighbourhood Policing officers were used to identify the individuals. The police operation then entered an enforcement phase resulting in:

- 184 individuals arrested for Class A drug supply. 110 of these were identified from the covert deployments at a cost of £2,000 per dealer (approx.). The additional arrests came from overt disruptions and community intelligence;
- Prison sentences totalling 200 years were set by the Courts;
- 6 kilos of Heroin / Crack / Cocaine were seized;
- 36% reduction in serious acquisitive crime in the target areas;
- 25% reduction in anti-social behaviour.<sup>21</sup>

2.5 In addition to these measurable impacts, more informal feedback from local communities has provided important insights into the potential benefits of these ways of working. It has been communicated that some of the individuals arrested and sentenced were previously seen as "untouchable" and beyond the reach of the police.

2.6 Operation Michigan and the work feeding into it illuminates how Neighbourhood Policing and more specialist policing assets can be "joined-up" to deliver more impactful interventions. It shows how a structured community engagement process can be used to identify problems, and how "localising" specialist assets can enhance the impact of interventions in ways that are visible and meaningful to citizens, so as to build public confidence and reduce street-crime. This localisation is something that appears to have been missing from the toolkit applied by SOCA. It also tends to refute oft made assumption that citizens do not care about serious organised crime issues. This case suggests that ordinary citizens may pick up on and detect the symptoms of organised criminality, but just like when going to the doctor, it requires a degree of expertise to correctly interpret any symptoms and to connect them to their cause.

3) *In addition to its principal focus on tackling organised crime, what other functions should the proposed new National Crime Agency undertake on behalf of police forces?*

3.1 There are certain common infrastructure functions that cannot be developed locally and/or it makes little sense to provide 43 times. For example, there are certain expert services that provide operational support to

<sup>20</sup> These issues are rehearsed in more detail in Innes, M and J Sheptycki (2004). "From detection to disruption: some consequences of intelligence-led crime control in the UK", *International Criminal Justice Review* (14) pp. 1-14.

<sup>21</sup> All figures supplied from South Wales Police's "results analysis".



local police services such as geographic profiling. These kinds of highly specialised expertise cannot be maintained locally and it would not make economic sense to do so. Relatedly, there are certain kinds of crime that are not locally based, require particular kinds of expertise, such as e-crime and economic crime, that should be delivered nationally.

4) *What should be the governance and accountability arrangements for the proposed new National Crime Agency?*

4.1 It is important that the arrangements are coherent with the broader direction of travel evident in relation to policing accountabilities. These changes are rendering certain aspects of police accountability more transparent. It was notable that the arrangements for SOCA felt completely different to those in place for other policing organisations inasmuch as their activities and work were far less transparent and less available to scrutiny.

4.2 Reflecting the comments under point 3, one area where particular attention is required is the connectivity that is achieved between national and local policing assets. The ability to “scale up” and “scale down” interventions from the neighbourhood to the national will be a key issue in determining the success or failure of the proposed reforms. Thus in thinking about the “accountability map” that should be put in place for the NCA, it will be important to consider the interplay between “upwards”, “downwards” and “sideways” accountabilities. Upwards accountability will be to Ministers and those afforded an oversight role of the agency’s work. But lines of accountability should also be put in place “downwards” to local communities to ensure that the NCA both “gives account” and “takes account” of their needs. In addition, forms of “sideways” accountability should be established with other policing and partner agencies to facilitate co-ordinated actions where these are required.<sup>22</sup>

5) *What should be the role of ACPO in the new landscape?*

5.1 ACPO should not be sustained in its current form with a wide-range of different and incoherent functions. ACPO should continue as an associative organisation for chief police officers to meet and co-ordinate their operational activities. This remit would be far narrower in scope and separate from the functions ACPO currently performs relating to the development of the policing profession. These should be assigned to a newly established “Royal College of Policing”.

5.2 A Royal College of Policing would perform similar functions to other such institutions. Currently in the policing landscape these are distributed amongst ACPO and its various committees, and the NPJA. Thus the Royal College would assume responsibility for:

- Developing the professional knowledge base of policing;
- Housing and maintaining the National Police Library;
- Issuing professional guidance about standard operating procedures for different policing tasks and roles;
- Setting the training requirement and standards for different levels of police rank up to Chief Officer (this to be delivered locally by HEIs);
- Delivering the educational input preceding promotion to Chief Officer;
- Establishing links and liaising with the other professional bodies for public service organisations;
- Supporting and advising police professionals in all stages of their careers;
- Acting as an advisory body to the Home Office and other government departments;
- Providing a mechanism where Police and Crime Commissioners can seek advice.

In sum the division of labour envisaged is that ACPO would retain ownership of operational policing matters and the Royal College would be the main portal for the development of policing as a profession.

March 2011

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**Written evidence submitted by the Howard League for Penal Reform**

The Howard League for Penal Reform is pleased to provide evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into “The New Landscape of Policing” and its examination of the ability of the white paper proposals to enhance the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of the police.

Amid wider discussions on re-focussing police priorities and a reduction of frontline services we are focussing our comments on children who come into the ambit of the police. It is the charity’s belief that the police is expending too many of its resources on arresting and detaining young children many of whom are in need of care and protection. The charity is currently conducting research into the overnight detention of young children in police custody suites, a practice that is both widespread and inappropriate, and research into the

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<sup>22</sup> The application of this accountability complex is outlined in Innes, M (2010). “Holding the police to account”, Bevan Review, 15: 18–19.

national picture of the arrest of young children. It is our contention that the police is not the appropriate agency to deal with young children.

## INTRODUCTION

As part of our work to understand the extent to which children are detained by the police we have commissioned a secondary analysis of information relating to the overnight detention of children in police custody in England and Wales. The comments provided are drawn from the initial findings from work that is due to be published in the next few months.

England and Wales has a more punitive approach to children who break the law (Jacobson et al. 2010) and is clearly illustrated by its low age of criminal responsibility. The European average age of criminal responsibility is 14 years whereas the age of criminal responsibility being 10 in England and Wales allows, even encourages, the police to arrest children behaving badly in contrast to our European neighbours who refer children back to parents or other agencies.

Police custody is the gateway into the youth justice process and is likely to exacerbate negative behaviour rather than stem it.

In police custody, children are defined as those aged 16 years and under, whilst 17 year olds are treated as adults. Children can find themselves detained for up to 24 hours or more in police custody and this may mean spending the night in a police cell, which can be a worrying, frightening and intimidating experience (Quinn and Jackson, 2003: 43–44).

At a time of reducing resources for front line policing, tying up expensive police time with low level nuisance activities of young children is a wasteful use of scarce public funding and detracts from attention to violent and organised crime.

### *How many children?*

Our research is yet to be published but we are presenting our initial findings to the committee to inform its inquiry.

The Howard League for Penal Reform utilised a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to all 43 police service areas in England and Wales to find out how many children under 16 years olds experienced police custody overnight during 2008 and 2009. Although there was only a partial response (24 police services provided information) in excess of 40,000 children still experienced overnight detention in police custody in the study period.

*Number of boys and girls detained overnight in police cells 2008–09 by police service area*

<i>Police service area</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Total</i>
Avon and Somerset Constabulary	338	1060	1,398
City of London Police	0	22	22
Cleveland Police	111	448	559
Cumbria Constabulary	60	208	268
Derbyshire Constabulary*	48	743	791
Devon and Cornwall	288	690	978
Dyfed Powys Police	47	199	246
Gloucestershire Constabulary	54	216	270
Greater Manchester Police	3,979	12,978	16,957
Hertfordshire Constabulary	56	332	388
Humberside Police	86	304	390
Kent Police	702	2,062	2,764
Lancashire	502	1,854	2,356
Leicestershire	179	703	882
Merseyside*	1,111	4031	5,142
Norfolk	19	103	122
North Wales	355	898	1,253
North Yorkshire	N/A	N/A	122
Nottinghamshire	183	1,120	1,303
Staffordshire	87	226	313
Thames Valley	103	534	637
West Mercia	N/A	N/A	577
West Yorkshire	256	1,589	1,845
	<b>8,564</b>	<b>30,320</b>	<b>40,284</b>

\* Information provided for 2009 only

Analysis of this data showed that most children detained overnight were 15 years old, 73% were boys and 25% were BME.

#### MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD CHILDREN

Children have a series of rights in police custody, which are safeguarded by provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 37 (b) states that:

No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time

Children's rights are also protected by domestic law such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the associated Codes of Practice and, at the local level, through the training and policies of individual police services relating to the overnight detention of children.

It is clear from our research that whilst the Convention is given lip service, the principles are being flouted as far too many children are detained for many long hours in police cells. Tens of thousands of children cannot be said to be a measure of last resort.

#### EMERGING ISSUES

A growing number of children are being drawn into the youth justice process unnecessarily. At a time when the use of formal sanctions and court convictions of children has fallen, the use of the police cell for many thousands of children is shocking.

It appears that many children are being taken into police custody for relatively minor issues. Data incorporated into our analysis suggests that overnight detention may be partly being used for those arrested for drunk and disorderly offences yet this is known to be a dangerous, inappropriate and contrary to child protection practice. The police should not be dealing with a drunk child, they should either be the responsibility of parents or other agencies.

The extent to which police services held children and young people in police custody overnight varied considerably. FOI data showed that as many as 42% of children detained by the police during the study period were held overnight in some areas, whereas other police services showed a smaller, although significant, proportion 23%.

Whether a child is detained overnight in the police station is also partially influenced by whether the police and local authority, as well as legal advisers, appropriate adults, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts can work together. Yet, difficulties have been identified with each of these agencies, which contribute to children's overnight detention particularly out of office hours.

#### SUMMARY

The Howard League for Penal Reform has concerns about the number of children experiencing police detention (in this instance overnight) and the current practices and application of safeguards relating to the detention of children. In changing the landscape of policing, with the potential for fewer frontline staff and contracting out of key aspects of policing, like the custody suite, we would suggest that careful consideration must be given to guidance to police to refer children at risk appropriately and to recognise that a police custody suite is not a place of safety for children.

It is the opinion of the Howard League for Penal Reform that police should have limited role in policing children. Indeed we would contend that no child under the age of 14 years should ever be held in police custody overnight. It should be regarded as a "never event".

#### REFERENCES

Jacobson J, Bhardwa B, Gyateng T, Hunter G, & Hough M (2010) *Punishing Disadvantage: a profile of children in custody*, Prison Reform Trust

Quinn, K and Jackson, J (2003) *The detention and questioning of young persons by the police in Northern Ireland*. Belfast: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency.

March 2011

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## Written evidence submitted Forensic Science Service

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In response to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into the new landscape of policing, the Forensic Science Service (FSS) is only able to comment on the sections regarding police procurement and collaboration, reflecting its own experiences within the last few years around the national framework for the procurement of forensic science.

2. Overall, we feel that the framework is a blunt instrument which concentrates on achieving lowest price as opposed to the best value for money. It drives commoditisation at the expense of a more strategic approach across the range of forensic services. Suppliers receive no volume commitments upon which they can manage capacity and resource. Whilst significant savings have been made by police forces in, what all would agree are, commodity areas such as simple DNA and drugs tests, these probably could have been procured more quickly and efficiently in a single national procurement process, as opposed to numerous individual tenders.

3. Police take-up of innovation has ground to a halt and it seems that opportunities to introduce innovative solutions to criminal justice issues are not developed. The FSS feels it is now kept much more at arms length as a result of the procurement process, meaning it is more difficult to engage in truly collaborative projects. We strongly believe that early collaboration on strategy can unlock improved value for money and help police reduce submissions; working together is the best way to reduce costs for police and provider alike.

### THE FSS RESPONSE

*What progress has the Government made so far, and what further steps should it take in driving:*

*(a) More effective procurement in the police service*

4. The FSS can only comment on its experiences with regard to police procurement of forensic science, concentrating on the period since 2008 when the National Forensic Framework Agreement (NFFA) was issued by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) on behalf of the police.

5. This is a framework which attempts to describe all aspects of forensic science procured by police forces, split into 12 lots. An initial tender exercise was carried out by the NPIA in order to register forensic science providers (FSPs) as accredited to supply against the framework, with the intention that when forces or groups of forces wanted to tender their work, very little additional work would be required on behalf of the tendering authority or the providers. In reality, the majority of the tenders that have taken place have selectively utilised parts of the framework, but have also introduced other bespoke elements, meaning each tender is a lengthy and relatively complicated process (and therefore also expensive) for all involved.

6. It was intended that a full round of tenders under the NFFA would have been completed by the end of 2011. In reality, by the time of the announcement regarding the closure of the FSS in December 2010, the timetable had slipped significantly with much of the more easily commoditised products such as DNA and drugs testing having gone through the process, but the majority of the more complex casework yet to be put out to tender.

7. Significant savings were realised by police forces in the commoditised product areas, with competitive tendering driving down the market price for these tests.

8. However, this commodity thinking and relatively rigid structure has been difficult to apply when considering more complex forensic casework that might be used to assist a murder or rape investigation for example, partly explaining the slip in the timetable. Trying to account for the numerous possible permutations of forensic science intervention that could be required in cases of this type has driven unhelpful complexity. As an illustration, the FSS was asked to provide 9,000 pricing points for the East Midlands region ITT.

9. In order to try and capture the multifarious forensic science requirements of the police, the NFFA has ended up breaking it down to the lowest common denominator of its component parts. As a result, discrimination between FSPs' offerings, in our experience, seems to be mainly based on price, with little consideration being given to quality or value for money. There is also no allowance or reward made within the framework for innovation and certainly no clear route to market for new offerings. The FSS has continued to have discussions with forces outside of the auspices of the NFFA regarding some of its added value, more holistic services (such as its specialist sexual offence service), but this is generally with forces who have yet to put these areas of work out to tender.

10. Once a provider has been awarded a tender, no guarantees are given with regards to the volume of work they will receive or to exclusivity of supply. These factors make accurate, cost effective capacity planning very difficult to achieve. Pricing has been based on historical profiles of work received of mixed complexity and work content, although in the last year the FSS has seen submissions profiles vary from this significantly due to increased pre-screening/in-sourcing of work and cherry picking of the work proffered to external providers.

11. It should be noted that in order to procure forensic science work in this way and to manage the contracts subsequently, many police forces have had to take on additional procurement and contract management staff. The administration burden of scientific support departments has also increased, with some "ordering" their

forensic science using the hundreds of product codes described in the NFFA, with not all parties agreeing what each one encompasses.

12. Rather than establishing and cementing a truly competitive, healthy market, the NFFA has contributed to its destabilisation, introducing significant uncertainty for existing FSPs and introducing barriers for new entrants.

(b) *Greater collaboration between forces and other partners, from both the private and the public sectors?*

13. As stated in the previous answer, the FSS' experience since the introduction of the NFFA is that it has stifled innovation (or at least its introduction) and also made collaboration much more difficult. In the past, the FSS has worked with individual forces or groups of forces to trial new techniques or ways of working, but now has to go through the NPIA as intermediate. In fact, the current view is that FSPs are now kept at arms length. As a result of this, in the last year, the FSS has had more discussions and collaborations with overseas criminal justice partners regarding some of its key innovations than it has with ACPO police forces in England and Wales.

14. The FSS has managed to maintain and develop a much more strategic approach with a few particular forces, outside of the NFFA. In these instances, costs have still been reduced (and match those currently delivered by the NFFA), and the close strategic relationship and joint working has also meant that the FSS has gained a much clearer understanding of the customer environment and has been able to identify opportunities to provide added value and innovative solutions.

#### ABOUT THE FSS

15. The Forensic Science Service (FSS) is the UK's leading forensic science provider with approximately 60% of the market. It provides the broadest range of forensic techniques from the crime scene to court room. The company is organised into national crime streams dealing with violent and volume crime, drugs, sexual offences, DNA and a range of disciplines, including fire investigation, documents, fibres, tool marks, terrorism, toxicology, accident investigation, firearms and blood pattern analysis. Between April 2009 and April 2010, the FSS handled over 90,000 cases.

16. The FSS can trace its roots back to the 1930s with a network of regional laboratories opening across the UK. In the late 1990s, the Met Police laboratory merged with the FSS. The company was given Executive Agency status in 1991, gained Trading Fund status in 1999 and subsequently became a GovCo in 2005.

17. In December 2010, the Government announced that it would be closing the FSS. Following this decision, the Board and senior management team are working to ensure that the wind-down is undertaken in a timely and orderly fashion, ensuring continuity of supply to the criminal justice system (CJS), and protecting valuable skills, capability and scientific knowledge of the dedicated and skilful scientists currently within the FSS.

*March 2011*

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### Written evidence submitted by ADS

#### SUMMARY

- ADS recommends that senior members of the UK police service should seek to engage the security industry strategically in the same manner that the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office has done since 2007. The framework of the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community (RISC) provides useful mechanisms for strategic interaction with the UK security industry.
- ADS recommends that the UK police service engages RISC on procurement issues. The aim should be to explore how improvements could be made to the commercial elements of the UK's national security and resilience market (and how companies of all sizes can work together in support of police priorities).
- ADS fully supports the policy recommendations of RISC which state that there are many opportunities to outsource parts of the management and delivery of policing to the private sector and that there is significant scope for efficiency and innovative service-based solutions.
- When it is created a new NCA should be given a robust remit for industrial engagement. Where it is appropriate the NCA should consider engaging with the UK security industry through RISC.

#### 1. ADS SUBMISSION CONTEXT

1.1 ADS is the trade organisation advancing the UK AeroSpace, Defence, and Security industries with Farnborough International Limited as a wholly-owned subsidiary. ADS also encompasses the British Aviation Group (BAG).

1.2 ADS was formed on 1 October 2009 from the merger of the Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers (APPSS), the Defence Manufacturers Association (DMA) and the Society of British Aerospace

Companies (SBAC). ADS comprises around 900 member companies within the industries it represents. Together with its regional partners, ADS represents over 2,600 companies across the UK supply chain.

1.3 Over 400 companies within the membership of ADS are heavily engaged in growing security, resilience and policing markets, at home and overseas, for which there are many interfaces with Government, the UK police service, the other emergency services and operators of the critical national infrastructure (CNI). Security-related SME's (small/medium sized enterprises) comprise 93% of the ADS membership with a heavy focus on upper tier technologies.

1.4 The UK security industry is a hi-tech and innovative sector which is well placed to provide technology, equipment, services and systems in support of the UK's counter-terrorism and policing efforts and in tackling the broader range of security risks facing the UK and its allies. It is also a significant contributor to the health of the UK economy.

1.5 Given the strong record of innovation in the sector, the industry is well placed to support the Government and the UK police service in achieving the country's priority of deficit reduction. Small, medium and large sized ADS member companies operating in the security sector have worked closely with police forces in the UK over many decades and have helped to enhance their security capabilities and reduce costs to the taxpayer. The UK security industry has built up considerable experience of this sector.

1.6 ADS would wish to continue to work in through the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community (RISC) to highlight the significant opportunities that industry can contribute to the UK police service in the context of the national priority of deficit reduction. The industry can contribute significantly to the need to deliver "Value for Money" around the UK's annual policing budget.

1.7 ADS is currently engaging with the UK police service formally in the form of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) through the "Police Capability Working Group" (PCWG) formed in cooperation with RISC during 2010. The HMIC has outlined areas that it wishes to concentrate on, such as value for money, benchmarking with industry and collaboration between forces.

1.8 In the view of ADS, there are significant opportunities for the UK police service to work even more closely with industry in the delivery of policing in the new landscape which the service does not currently adequately recognize. Therefore, ADS welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this inquiry.

## 2. ADS SUBMISSION TO INQUIRY

ADS would wish to contribute answers to three questions raised within the terms of reference of the inquiry:

### 2.1 *What progress has the Government made so far, and what further steps should it take, in driving more effective procurement in the police service*

2.1.1 ADS believes that there is a need to pay renewed attention to, and deliver reform around, the system for policing procurement.

2.1.2 There can be significant savings to be had through central procurement in some areas and many forces have already benefitted through the adoption of this approach. To some extent central procurement means profit margins are thinner, but that contracts would be for larger volumes and could be less volatile. However, some of the existing mechanisms for central procurement are seen to be ineffectual. Some of the framework contracts driven by the NPIA are considered in industry to be suboptimal.

2.1.3 Whilst central procurement may not be appropriate in all circumstances, ADS believes that central procurement is appropriate in some areas of policing. Where areas of common process and tools in procurement may exist (eg vehicles, uniforms, radios) a centralised procurement approach (and/or a lead force model which establishes a national framework as has delivered benefits in the past) would make sense and industry would welcome clarity on all those functions that are likely to be subject to this approach.

2.1.4 ADS would wish to make the point that the total adoption of new central commercial models could lay vulnerable very small businesses who have dedicated over 20 years to ensuring that the products they develop are suitable to the police market.

2.1.5 Any existing or new framework contracts in the policing sector should take account of both the benefits that large companies can bring and the significant contribution that SMEs make to the UK security and policing markets. This makes sense not only to find the best technologies for the police service but will contribute to SMEs' ability to export thus benefitting the UK economy as a whole.

2.1.6 ADS recommends that the UK police service engages RISC on procurement issues. The aim should be to explore how improvements could be made to the commercial elements of the UK's national security and resilience market (and how companies of all sizes can work together in support of police priorities).

*2.2 What progress has the Government made so far, and what further steps should it take, in driving greater collaboration between forces and other partners, from both the private and the public sectors?*

2.2.1 ADS believes that questions over how to deliver policing functions between forces more collaboratively has been on the policing agenda for many years. The police service is aware of the inefficient use of resources associated with the structure of its force boundaries. The time is right to clarify the functions that should be delivered collaboratively.

2.2.2 ADS recognizes that work is already underway across the police service to determine how forces can collaborate around many of the functions and operational capabilities listed above. Furthermore, it is fortunate that in emerging specialist areas such as CBRN the service has sought to address these collaboration issues from the outset (albeit this has arisen from central funding). As a consequence capability is unlikely to be compromised at local, regional or national levels.

2.2.3 ADS believes that in some parts of the UK police service there is evidence of an aversion to significant new levels of strategic engagement with industry in the delivery of policing. ADS believes that closer working between the police service and industry has in the past been inhibited by amongst other items the propensity of some suppliers to “cry foul” against customers if they believe they are being disadvantaged by the bureaucracy that exists between operational users and suppliers.

2.2.4 ADS believes that whilst this propensity has been demonstrated by a small minority of suppliers in the past these obstacles can now be overcome by adopting the new mechanisms that have been established for industrial engagement. ADS recommends that senior members of the UK police service should seek to engage the security industry strategically in the same manner that the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office has done since 2007. The framework of RISC provides useful mechanisms for strategic interaction with the UK security industry.

2.2.5 ADS fully supports the policy recommendations of RISC which state that there are many opportunities to outsource parts of the management and delivery of policing to the private sector and that there is significant scope for efficiency and innovative service-based solutions.

*2.3 In addition to its principal focus on tackling organised crime, what other functions should the proposed new National Crime Agency undertake on behalf of police forces?*

2.3.1 ADS recommends that when it is created a new NCA should be given a robust remit for industrial engagement. Where it is appropriate the NCA should consider engaging with the UK security industry through RISC.

2.3.2 In the view of ADS, the development of “industrial engagement” as a cross-cutting feature of the NCA’s activity would result in a better informed customer / supplier relationship across the UK police service at the national level. This would support help to support national policing objectives and, from the industrial perspective, fulfill the economic potential of the UK security industry.

### 3. CONCLUDING REMARKS

3.1 ADS member companies already support the UK police service with a wide range of systems, services, technologies and equipment. Previous iterations of the UK’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (CONTEST) recognizes that the security supply community is an essential partner to Government in delivering national security and the Coalition Government has expressed the same philosophy publicly on many occasions. The industry is keen to show that it is committed to helping to support the Government’s national security and policing efforts through RISC.

3.2 The time is right to extend the strategic relationship that industry has developed with the Government to a wider range of stakeholders within the UK police service. Whilst the Government has gone out of its way to engage the supply side of industry through RISC on these issues, and it should be noted that many individual police forces engage industrial suppliers routinely and proactively, more could be done to ensure that appropriate industrial capabilities can be developed and deployed by the UK police service in support of national and local policing priorities.

3.3 Provided that it is taken into the trust of the UK police service in a genuine spirit of partnership, the security industry (and “business” more widely) can provide new thinking to the public sector at no increased cost on how companies of all sizes can help to deliver national security whilst at the same time reducing the costs associated with local policing and the Home Office’s overall budget significantly. Improved dialogue between the police service and industry will increase mutual confidence and respect.

3.4 ADS recommends that the UK police service works with the security industry through RISC to develop the mechanisms for engagement that will be needed to reduce the deficit and generate the capabilities that are needed for the new landscape of policing.

## Written evidence submitted by Clinks

### 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 As the national umbrella body for the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) working with offenders, Clinks' written evidence to the Home Affairs Committee recommends further steps to drive collaboration between police forces and local VCS organisations as key partners in delivering safer communities, alongside those from the private and public sectors.

1.2 The submission draws heavily on Clinks' recent extensive consultation with VCS organisations on the Ministry of Justice's Green Paper, *Breaking the Cycle*, and on our current experience of managing innovative local partnership work for the Home Office in relation to Integrated Offender Management.

### 2. ABOUT CLINKS

2.1 Clinks exists to provide infrastructure support to the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) working with offenders across England and Wales. Our mission is to support, represent and campaign for the Sector, so that VCS organisations, and all those with whom they work, are engaged and informed to transform offenders' lives and reduce reoffending.

2.2 We are a membership organisation with over 300 members, including the Sector's largest providers as well as its smallest, and our wider national network reaches 3,500 VCS contacts. Overall, through our weekly e-bulletin *Light Lunch*, we are in contact with over 5,500 individuals and agencies with an interest in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) and the role of the VCS in the resettlement and rehabilitation of offenders.

2.3 Clinks also plays a significant role at national level in informing Government policy on community safety, for example as a member of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) / NOMS Reducing Reoffending Third Sector Advisory Group.

2.4 Our written evidence on the *New Landscape of Policing* is informed by particular work that we have undertaken since the election of the new coalition Government in 2010, to engage the Sector in the debate about the future of Criminal Justice Services. For example, we have recently published an on-line series of five themed Discussion Papers<sup>23</sup> focussed on key aspects of the Government's vision for a "Rehabilitation Revolution":

- *Big Society: constraints and potentials;*
- *Localising justice: how can we increase local VCS involvement in service design and delivery?*
- *Payment by results: what does it mean for voluntary organisations working with offenders?*
- *A new focus on measuring outcomes: where do we start?*
- *Criminal justice outsourcing: what is the potential role of the VCS?*

2.5 Following publication in December 2010 of the MoJ's Green Paper, *Breaking the Cycle*, Clinks convened seven events in various locations including London, the South West, Midlands, North West and North East regions, in order to gather the views of our members and wider VCS network on the proposals and questions set out in the Green Paper. In total, over 400 organisations participated in these events. All of these responses were subsequently collated and reflected in the response to the Green Paper that Clinks submitted to MoJ in March 2011.<sup>24</sup>

### 3. EVIDENCE

3.1 Clinks is submitting written evidence to the Committee in response to its question:

*What progress has the Government made so far, and what further steps should it take, in driving greater collaboration between forces and other partners from both the private and the public sectors?*

3.2 As the key national body representing the voice of the VCS working in the CJS, we would urge the Committee to broaden this question and to acknowledge that Government has a key role in driving greater collaboration between forces and local VCS organisations as key partners in delivering safer communities, alongside those from the private and public sectors.

3.3 The importance of engaging with and harnessing the potential of the VCS to support the new agenda has been underlined in all the key policy documents on criminal justice and policing issued by Government over the past year. In particular, the Government's consultation paper *Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People*<sup>25</sup> contains plans to increase local accountability and address the disconnection between the police and communities by reversing the trend towards centralisation. It sees the Big Society as the vehicle for transforming the relationship between the police, partners and the public and to encourage collective action. The Government therefore aims to:

<sup>23</sup> See Clinks' Discussion Papers at: <http://www.clinks.org/publications/discussion-papers>

<sup>24</sup> See Clinks' response to the Green Paper, *Breaking the Cycle*, at: <http://www.clinks.org/publications/responses>

<sup>25</sup> Home Office. 2010. *Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting the Police and the People*. Online: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/consultations/policing-21st-century/>



*...empower the Big Society; reforming our wider approach to cutting crime, making sure everyone plays their full part in cutting crime in a Big Society—wider criminal justice and community safety partners, the voluntary and community sector and individuals themselves.*

3.4 The new Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) will clearly be at the heart of local arrangements for crime prevention and should therefore have a key role in ensuring that local VCS partners are fully engaged both strategically (to inform the commissioning of locally relevant, integrated multi-agency interventions) and operationally (to deliver tangible positive outcomes that address locally set priorities).

3.5 Concerns have already been voiced, however, that one elected Commissioner will concentrate power rather than disperse it.<sup>26</sup> With one PCC replacing the Police Authorities, which were typically composed of seventeen members or more, there is a risk of overload. Community engagement requires interaction at a very local level and the PCC will be appointed at force level. The Home Affairs Committee's own recently published research paper<sup>27</sup> highlighted the danger of "local tensions and public disenchantment" resulting where the PCC is unable to represent the diverse community they serve. The creation of effective links with local community and voluntary groups will therefore be essential in assisting the PCC to provide substantive representation.

3.6 A significant barrier to progress in this regard is that the proposed reforms are currently very lightly sketched. There is little detail as yet on the local structures needed to support Government policy in terms of accountabilities and the allocation of budgets and commissioning responsibilities between PCCs, Local Authorities, Community Safety Partnerships, Integrated Offender Management Boards, Probation Trusts, Health Services and Prisons. Many local VCS organisations are voicing frustration about this lack of clarity at a time when it is becoming critical for them to forge new relationships with key public and private sector partners at local level in order to play their full part in reducing crime.

3.7 The new Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) established to scrutinise the work of PCCs should provide one important mechanism for enhanced VCS and public involvement, particularly in areas where police engagement with the Sector is currently poorly developed. A representative for the Sector, possibly identified through the VCS Local Infrastructure Organisation (LIO),<sup>28</sup> would be an asset in terms of police engagement with the wider community. A central mandate from Government on how the Panels are composed would therefore be very useful.

3.8 As well as giving the public a voice through the PCPs, it is anticipated that the elected PCCs will engender greater confidence among local people to be involved in the criminal justice system: providing information, acting as witnesses and taking action to reduce anti-social behaviour. Members of the public will be encouraged to become "neighbourhood activists" and "community crime fighters" to determine local solutions for their neighbourhood.

3.9 It is Clinks' experience that this volunteer base is likely to be highly variable across different localities and there will need to be local brokerage to match resources with need, otherwise there is a real danger that community safety will be determined by postcode lottery. Local VCS organisations, working with some of the most excluded and vulnerable members of their communities, could offer a crucial access point for effective local social action. It is therefore important to consider the mechanisms that will be needed to map and engage with voluntary and community groups that are already operating in the local area, and ensure that the PCC recognises and draws on these existing sources of support.

3.10 All of this work relies on the police, other statutory agencies and the VCS effectively responding to local need and engaging with one another. It is therefore imperative that the VCS is considered an equal and independent partner and is adequately funded to play a central role in local crime reduction. The VCS have a historic partnership ethos and a wealth of experience working in partnership with different statutory agencies. However, historically the police have more limited experience of working in partnership with the VCS and, apart from the work of the Neighbourhood Policing Teams, have only recently started to build partnership links.

3.11 In 2010, the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) published helpful guidance for Neighbourhood Policing Teams on working with VCS partners.<sup>29</sup> This includes a list of qualities that the VCS can offer to the statutory sector:

- reaching out to excluded communities using a flexible approach and delivery;
- building confidence and abilities of those who volunteer;
- strengthening trust and providing innovative solutions to the new problems that society faces; and

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<sup>26</sup> Lord Shipley. House of Lords *Police—Debate*. 25 Nov 2010. Online: <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2010-11-25a.1230.0&s=justice#g1245.0>

<sup>27</sup> House of Commons Home Affairs Committee. Dec 2010. *Policing: Police and Crime Commissioners*. Online: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhaff/511/511.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> LIO: Local Infrastructure Organisation—a charitable body such as a Council for Voluntary Service that typically provides a range of support services for all the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) organisations within its area. These might include help with organisational development, funding advice, training, and co-ordinating the sector's engagement with and representation on local strategic groupings such as the Local Strategic Partnership. Many LIOs have Volunteer Centres attached to their organisations or work very closely with them.

<sup>29</sup> NPIA. 2010. *Working with the third sector: A guide for neighbourhood policing teams and partners*. Online: <http://www.npiadocuments.co.uk/thirdsectorguidance.pdf>

- providing a voice for its communities in ways government cannot.

3.12 This sort of guidance will be increasingly important to help all police teams to understand, engage with and involve VCS partners in their work at a very local level. With the phasing out of the National Policing Improvement Agency, it remains unclear what mechanisms will exist to disseminate and promote good partnership practice to local forces and individual police officers. Clarification of this important area of Government responsibility would be welcomed.

3.13 There is undoubtedly good emergent partnership practice to be shared with local forces and the new PCCs. For example, in September 2010, Clinks was commissioned by the Home Office to oversee a five month funded project to develop “Innovative VCS Involvement in Integrated Offender Management Arrangements” across four “development and demonstration areas”: Bournemouth, Dorset & Poole; Croydon; Gloucestershire; and Leeds.

3.14 Grant funding was made available for distribution by Clinks to support VCS-led initiatives to achieve one or more of the following outcomes in relation to partnership work with local Integrated Offender Management (IOM):

- greater involvement from the VCS in working with offenders;
- an increased level of VCS input into IOM;
- better linkages between VCS and statutory sector partners to implement IOM;
- involvement of smaller VCS organisations that have not so far engaged with the criminal justice agenda;
- greater user involvement in decisions about services and support;
- greater community engagement and involvement in identified neighbourhoods;
- more local people involved in volunteering/mentoring/advising; and
- reduced re-offending.

3.15 This project is now reaching its end and an evaluation report is currently under preparation by the Hallam Centre for Community Justice at Sheffield Hallam University, who will also be producing a local partnership toolkit based on learning from the project. Without wishing in any way to pre-empt these findings, it is Clinks’ experience that the project has very much demonstrated the flexibility and readiness of the VCS to innovate at speed to address local crime reduction needs, when given the opportunity to play a leading role.

3.16 Statutory IOM partners, including those from the police, have especially valued the brokerage roles that knowledgeable and committed LIOs or other leading VCS organisations, can play in terms of strategic partnership work, outreach to the wider community, and local signposting / referral to VCS services.

3.17 Small grants, administered locally and imposing very light bureaucratic burdens on applicants, have also enabled small VCS groups and social enterprises to begin to engage with IOM and develop some highly innovative and sustainable work to reduce reoffending. However, all of this partnership work is dependent on good local leadership and facilitation, and adequate funding. Government support continues to be needed to ensure that local commissioners recognise the value of these approaches and that actively involving the VCS in delivery is routinely built into their strategic plans.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of this evidence, Clinks would urge the Committee to consider the following recommendations to Government, in order to drive greater collaboration between forces and local VCS organisations as key partners in delivering safer communities, alongside those from the private and public sectors:

4.1 Give the new Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) explicit responsibility for ensuring that local VCS partners are fully engaged both strategically (to inform the commissioning of locally relevant, integrated multi-agency interventions) and operationally (to deliver tangible positive outcomes that address locally set priorities).

4.2 Clarify as quickly as possible the future local structures to support Government policy in terms of accountabilities and the allocation of budgets and commissioning responsibilities between PCCs, Local Authorities, Community Safety Partnerships, Integrated Offender Management Boards, Probation Trusts, Health Services and Prisons.

4.3 Issue guidance / mandate on the composition of Police and Crime Panels, including mechanisms for VCS representation.

4.4 Ensure that the PCC recognises and works proactively with existing sources of VCS support such as VCS Local Infrastructure Organisations, in order to encourage and develop local community activism.

4.5 Emphasise the role of the VCS as an equal and independent partner, and ensure it is adequately funded to play a central role in local crime reduction.

4.6 With the phasing out of the National Policing Improvement Agency, clarify what mechanisms will exist to disseminate and promote guidance on good partnership practice to local forces and individual police officers.

March 2011

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#### **Written evidence submitted by European Secure Vehicle Alliance**

Most value influencing the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of the police will be gained by focusing unerringly on the role of the local police area commander and their relationships with the public and key local stakeholders.

The concept of bureaucracy can perhaps be reframed to mean any activity which does not contribute to the local area commander and their team in exercising their discretion and achieving their purpose of reducing crime and enhancing the public's actual and perceived sense of safety.

Whilst recognising that success for local policing does require the ability to respond effectively to incidents of crime, disorder and community crisis, a greater value must be recognised in reducing inappropriate demands for response primarily by resolving the underlying causes that lead to the above demand.

To enable local police area commanders to be a successful and capable leaders, they require a support structure which embraces the risk of failure and provides appropriate support at times of both success and failure.

Success for local policing requires a paradigm shift from policing with consent to policing with the active co-operation of all compliant citizens so that the greatest possible effort and pressure is applied on the small and lessening cohort of non-compliers.

The focus of parliamentary attention warrants further refinement to investigate local policing as well as issues that relate to central bodies such as the Home Office, Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). A key role for Police and Crime Commissioners will be to support local area police commanders as detailed above.

Policing policy must celebrate and respect diversity in all local policing areas and stimulate an appropriate level of local analysis on demand for services and their underlying causes. The next step should then be to ensure that appropriate support is provided from all other public sector stakeholders, criminal justice partners, local business and citizens.

The plethora of top-down targets has served to distract all local police officers and their colleagues in related services. There has been too much attention paid to meeting the requirements and demands emanating from above and as a result the down-weighting or inattention to local issues. Furthermore, initial crime and disorder signals often mask underlying causes which are not effectively analysed and addressed.

The steady emergence of an unforgiving culture associated with the management of risk has resulted in mountains of reports seeking to avoid a sanction in the case of failure. This situation is compounded by a dilemma faced in the police service in that it is responsible for tackling internal issues such as corruption and poor performance whilst offering appropriate support at times when such action is required by deserving officers and staff.

Local policing is at its most effective when the vast majority of local citizens trust the police and share a commitment to tackle non-compliant behaviour appropriately. The "wavering non-compliers" are challenged appropriately and invited to see the virtue of entering the "fold of compliance" thereby generating considerable energy and capacity to tackle effectively the "serial non-compliers".

In all likelihood—community sanctions will apply for the "wavering non-compliers" and the criminal justice system used to its maximum impact on the "serial non-compliers". This approach is not new and has operated both formally and informally for many years but the considerable weight of new legislation and centralised direction associated with a disproportionate concern regarding the management of risk has diluted the impact of "common sense" or perhaps more appropriately "good sense" policing.

Considerable care should be taken in assessing the value of buying in private sector support for policing and also the benefits associated with the shared service model. Both of these strategic intents have the tendency to remove decision making from the local areas and focus on central commissioning.

My personal experience leaves me yet to be convinced that strategies such as outsourcing custody management deliver sustained cost savings. In addition, my initial contact with policing was at the time when most local police stations operated their own control room which naturally enabled the development of strong bonds between call handlers and local police officers and staff. HR benefits provided by central services may also appear to deliver value, but again local responsiveness and knowledge has a tendency to be undervalued. Do we lose the "intimacy and commitment" generated as a result of local managers making their own local recruitment decisions? In addition, we do need to focus more on the development of the local policing family where police community support officers, community wardens and other local guardians contribute to meeting the local policing purpose.

My own experience of interacting with police officers and staff at all levels—and especially new recruits—leads me to consider that we are blessed with an extremely capable and committed cohort of people. Our challenge in governance is to seek to influence and enhance its further development in a sensitive and considered manner, valuing diversity, and encouraging the service to sustainably improve itself, whilst being supported and influenced appropriately by a governance regime that is also fit for purpose.

May 2011

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### Written evidence submitted by Mr Richard Davis

The following themes for the inquiry are suggested:

- Review the purpose of policing.
- Understand problem solving methods not crime label transactions.
- Create better partnerships based on joint knowledge of community problems, not target driven transactions. Move to an expertise driven management system and away from the worst of the military hierarchy.

#### PURPOSE

Very little of the demand from communities is now “crime”. It is activity and circumstance that creates disquiet in citizens but is better described as symptoms of social “malaise”.

There are three broad groups of people (as is evident in any magistrates court). The first group are the small number of serious criminals for whom the response should be as it currently is—catch them, imprison them and identify every opportunity to rehabilitate.

The second, who comprise the majority, are people with chaotic lives who have had little help (and not helped themselves) to get back in control. They are frequently multiple “offenders”. Although magistrates try and take their lifestyle and hopes into consideration, the criminal system (police and Crown Prosecution Service) treat them purely as criminal transactions, out of any context. Criminalising these people creates a self fulfilling problem of revolving doors and no problems solved either for the people or their communities.

The third group is the majority—the well adapted citizen who can look after themselves. The current system frequently fails to treat them as such and criminalises people mindlessly. It also needs to have the right stabilising response to those who do make a mistake and who do need to understand the consequences. That response should not be one that encourages more criminality, however inadvertent.

The problem for the police is that there is no one agency with this overall responsibility. They are in the position of having to lead those other agencies and develop a common language to help everyone solve the right problems.

#### LABELS

The Home Office’s set of labels for crimes and incidents has created a system where the police go looking for the label and apply a set of procedures that match the label and keep Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) happy. The labels do not help the police learn what matters to communities nor how to improve. Thus, “vulnerable people” are labelled but little of any consequence is done to resolve their vulnerability.

The crime mapping system is potentially very helpful but the current labels make it a nonsense. Perfectly ordinary towns and streets have been labelled “crime hot spots” for no good reason. The police should be encouraged to find descriptions that match the themes of problem that matter to communities and that reflect the true causes (ie the problem that we need to solve).

This should lead to a notion of “purposeful recording” where the only outcome of recording is to learn and demonstrate that action was effective. (ie the problem does not happen anymore).

#### MANAGEMENT CULTURE

The police demonstrate the worst of the military hierarchy. The military always rely on the initiative and knowledge of the people on the spot. The commander always knows that the person in the command bunker knows nothing. The target culture knocked that logic out of policing and the concept of discretion has been lost. The purpose of the hierarchy is “control” whereas it should be one of access to expertise—the manager should be helpful for what they know, not their ability to deliver targets up and down. The ratio of officers to constables also needs examining.

May 2011

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## Written evidence submitted by Research In Motion (RIM) UK

### SUMMARY

- Police efficiency can be dramatically improved by providing access to the full range of intelligence and information for officers when on the move.
- The technology now exists to provide this information in a portable and secure system that can support the full range of police functions.
- Government must retain the capability to provide support for pilot projects in individual forces in order to develop best practices that can be replicated across other forces.

### INTRODUCTION

Research In Motion, the manufacturers of the BlackBerry handheld device, is delighted to contribute to the Home Affairs Committee Inquiry, *The New Landscape of Policing*. As a leading designer, manufacturer and marketer of innovative wireless technologies, RIM works extensively with the UK public sector and has been working alongside police forces since 2001:

- Currently over 50,000 BlackBerry devices are deployed in the UK police force.
- The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) estimates that 30 minutes per officer per day are saved following the implementation of mobile data.<sup>30</sup>
- BlackBerry provides secure access to the Police National Computer and other intelligence databases on-the-beat.
- BlackBerry deployments have reduced time spent in the station from 46%–36% and increased visible patrol time from 14–19% in one force.
- BlackBerry has been approved up to “restricted” level by the Communications Electronic Security Group (CESG), the UK Government’s National Technical Authority for Information Assurance.
- The BlackBerry is the only smartphone to have this level of security. This is a result of a sustained investment in the appropriate technology by Research In Motion.
- RIM’s international experience includes NATO, the FBI and CIA.

Major deployments of the BlackBerry solution have been made across the UK police force providing a high proportion of frontline officers with secure, mobile access to the:

- Police National Computer (PNC) (including firearms licences and the Schengen Visas databases).
- NICHE Records Management System (RMS).
- Warrants database.
- Electoral Roll.
- Command and control.
- Case and custody records.
- Intelligence briefings.
- Crime Tasking.
- PNLDB (Police National Legal Database).

Access to functions such as these on the move allows officers to spend more time on visible and reassurance policing. BlackBerry devices can also provide the capability for local residents to directly contact their local police officer via email.

RIM notes that lifting the restriction that police forces face in accessing information from the

Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) photo licence database on mobile devices would contribute to a decline in non-arrests and mistaken identity.

### EVIDENCE

RIM continues to develop new partnerships to support UK police forces and local authorities’ efforts to reduce bureaucracy and increase the amount of time that police officers spend on the front line.

Recent examples of partnership working include:

- A partnership with South Yorkshire Police and the Department for Transport: the CRASH initiative enables police attending collisions to collect and record information remotely which is sent directly to the relevant database. Benefits include a saving in reporting officer and back-office time, the ability to collect statistical data quickly and easily alongside the collision details, and quick submission for all partners to use for road safety measures. The scheme was piloted in South Yorkshire and will be rolled out to all forces at the end of this year.

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<sup>30</sup> National Policing Improvement Agency quoted in *Protecting the Public: Supporting the Police to Succeed* Home Office White Paper 2009.

- Hampshire Constabulary’s adoption of Electronic Witness Statements (EWS): The EWS will be introduced by Hampshire Constabulary in spring 2011 with the full support of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and the Crown Prosecution Service. EWS means that witness statements can be created digitally and captured via a mobile data terminal, with the witness using a stylus to sign the screen or an electronic pad. After an initial 12-week trial period involving 150 police officers, feedback and data will be used to develop an EWS national standard.
- West Yorkshire Police hand e-pix application: Following an initial trial of 500 devices West Yorkshire Police are now deploying 3,400 devices with the hand-e-pix application to take photos to use as evidence in court and seized equipment at a crime scene. The BlackBerry application allows police officers to capture “who”, “where” and “when” for each photo taken and to send the information wirelessly to a central server.
- Merseyside Police Authority is currently trialling BlackBerry technology to support the sharing of information between local community and support officers and police officers. The deployment is based on an application which provides police officers with an interactive map of the city centre. This allows police officers to highlight sections of the map which are off limits for PCSOs and show police officers where they should be.

#### DRIVING INNOVATION

We note that the model of piloting new solutions in one or more police force allows the private sector to work closely with individual police forces to identify and solve difficulties before technology solutions are adopted more widely. We recommend that this model is most suitable for enabling new technologies to be effectively adopted and deployed throughout the police force.

We would like to stress that the NPIA has played an important role in forging pilot schemes and spreading best practice not least through the Mobile Information Programme.

The NPIA also plays an important role in helping forces understand where they can make savings and in delivering collaborative frameworks for police procurement. Disbanding the NPIA may lead to functions, resources and accountability being split across myriad organisations. This may add further layers of complexity to the governance structure of the police force which could make it harder to introduce new technology into the police force.

The formation of the National Crime Agency must not be accompanied by the loss of this capability. As far as possible this capability should be transferred fully intact to the new body, with a continuing clear remit to support innovation through technology.

#### CONCLUSION

We believe that secure mobile technology has a key role to play in crime prevention and is already making a difference to a range of frontline services including reducing the amount of time police officers spend on administration and enabling more accurate photographic evidence to be used in court.

We look forward to continuing our work with local government and police authorities in the UK to expand on the use of mobile data, crime mapping and geo-tagging as part of our ongoing efforts to develop the best tools to assist them in their work.

We caution against making changes to the structure of the police force that may make piloting new technologies and deploying solutions more bureaucratic.

We hope that this outline of some of our experience in supporting local services and police authorities is helpful to your inquiry. We would be very happy to meet with you or facilitate meetings with our partners to share direct experience of these issues. We would also be more than happy to provide oral evidence to the Committee.

*May 2011*

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#### **Written evidence submitted by Mrs Jennifer Roden**

As an active member of the Park Hall Area Neighbourhood Watch, Walsall, for many years, I must stress that as a community we are concerned about any reduction in Police numbers. We have 2,500 members and are grateful that our combined efforts with our local Police force has meant that the crime rate in the Park Hall Area is comparatively low compared with surrounding areas.

We have for example, through our annual subscriptions, purchased bicycles for our community Police to help with their patrols of the area and together, with the vigilance of our community, it has enabled the Police to make enquiries and subsequent arrests on occasions.

We strongly believe that any reduction in Police numbers will have a detrimental effect on crime rates in the Walsall area, giving criminals more freedom.

May 2011

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### **Written evidence submitted by Staffordshire Police**

#### **1. BACKGROUND**

1.1 Staffordshire Police's mission is "Keeping our communities safe and reassured". Our strategic priorities focus on delivering quality services, delivering professional excellence and value for money. We will deliver these through an operational plan which focuses on: providing quality services; reducing crime and disorder; and protecting people from harm.

1.2 Staffordshire is a diverse county encompassing Stoke-on-Trent and the Peak District in the north and curving above the urban West Midlands in the south. With a total population of approximately 1.62 million, the county has pockets of high-density housing as well as large expanses of countryside. Pockets of affluence exist in the commuter belt in the south, but there are also areas of extensive deprivation.

1.3 Staffordshire benefits from a number of key transport routes. However, while these bring prosperity they also assist cross-border crime and are a source of major congestion, road traffic accidents and bring strategic roads policing challenges.

#### **2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

2.1 The current financial situation facing the force and the Police Authority is challenging—but at a time when budgets are reducing significantly, crime continues to fall and victims' satisfaction rates are going up. Last year saw the lowest crime levels in nine years since the current method of recording crime was introduced in 2002 whilst saving £11 million.

2.2 The force and Police Authority is in a strong position because Phase One of our Communities First Programme, which has seen the complete restructuring of the force, has been finalised. The force replaced its four divisions (Basic Command Units) and 21 neighbourhood policing units with nine local policing teams which match local authority boundaries.

2.3 This reduces management layers, business support costs and encourages even greater partnership working to improve services.

2.4 Throughout these changes, the force and Police Authority have remained committed to protecting neighbourhood policing numbers in order to continue to deliver a robust service to the communities we serve.

2.5 The newly created Investigative Services Department will improve the way we investigate more serious and major crime.

2.6 The force and Police Authority have streamlined business support functions such as finance, human resources and information technology to become more efficient. We have also reduced management levels to ensure that we put as much into frontline policing as we can.

2.7 Inevitably and unfortunately, given that over 80% of our budget is spent on our people, we have had to shrink our workforce. We have also made £3 million in non-pay savings in stationery, equipment and other areas.

2.8 We made £11 million in savings last year (2010–11) and, through further streamlining our processes and procedures, we aim to save a further £11 million this year (2011–12).

2.9 Furthermore, the force and Staffordshire Police Authority has approved a major project to develop efficiencies of approximately £3.5 million over a three year period by looking at our big expenditure areas, including incident management from initial call to deployment, the life of a crime from recording to resolution and intelligence gathering, tasking and coordination.

2.10 We are currently investigating closer collaboration with neighbouring West Midlands Police. A new joint head of Information Technology for Staffordshire and West Midlands Police has been appointed which lays the foundation of even closer collaboration, paving the way for IT systems to be harmonised in support of cross-border operational policing. We are actively looking at collaborative work on uniformed operations and legal services while future work will focus on control centres, Justice Services, Custody (specifically IT and medical provision), and Forensics.

2.11 Collaboration on operational matters is continuing with Staffordshire and our three regional neighbours (West Midlands, Warwickshire and West Mercia). Specific focus is on intelligence, prison intelligence and asset recovery. Excluding Warwickshire—we're also continuing to work regionally on Central Motorway Police Group (CMPG) and public order training.

2.12 The force and the Police Authority are also continuing closer partnership working with neighbouring councils and emergency services. Specific work to streamline processes and reduce budgets is ongoing with Staffordshire County Council, Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service and local councils, for example the rationalisation of the public estate and the sharing of premises.

### 3. OUR APPROACH TO PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

3.1 Staffordshire Police's Communities First Programme has been governed by Staffordshire Police Authority, Communities First Programme Board, Chief Officer Management Meetings, Strategic Resource Panel and key stakeholders.

3.2 Management of the programme has also been robust—we have consulted and engaged with staff associations and trade unions at programme level, strategic resourcing level and within each and every work element

3.3 Supporting the governance of the change programme has been a detailed Strategic Resourcing Plan and associated Strategic Resource Panel with agreed terms of reference and human resource protocol. The involvement of key stakeholders in the resource panel has enabled the new business areas and non-pay cost reduction approach of the force to be implemented with a set of clear guiding principles.

3.4 An excellent communication tool showing the progress of meeting the “challenge” has been through the development of key strategic resource products. Glidepath templates, that clearly demonstrate the ability of the force and Police Authority to track decision making and meet the medium term finance strategy, have been essential.

3.5 During the Communities First Programme, the change team formed strategic partnerships and collaborated with regional force colleagues to build knowledge and experience. External specialist consultants and the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) were also engaged for specific work areas.

3.6 Process modeling supported our evidence-based decision making and the testing of new operational delivery models. We used this demand versus resource scenario for the next four years, specifically when we wanted to make sure new business areas had sufficient resources to meet demand and the correct shift systems were being worked.

3.7 Equality Impact Assessments were also used to inform all key programme decisions and present transparency to such decisions.

### 4. DELIVERING LOCAL POLICING SERVICES

4.1 As part of the Communities First Programme, the force has replaced its four divisions (Basic Command Units) and 21 neighbourhood policing units with nine Local Policing Teams (LPT) which match local authority boundaries.

4.2 Throughout the changes to more streamlined local policing teams, and a reduction in our budget, the force and the Police Authority have remained committed to the protection of neighbourhood officer numbers until 2013. This has highlighted our commitment to providing a quality service to our communities and ultimately has proved beneficial to ensuring the support of communities and key stakeholders through the change process.

4.3 Support has also been gained through developing and refining neighbourhood work with partners. We've seen a reduction in the number of operational sites by co-locating with partners at police stations as well as council buildings. Our service is about people not buildings and we want more officers co-located in shared premises at the heart of communities. Operational officers have access to the latest technology such as the Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) allowing them to work away from traditional police stations within communities where the public want to see them.

4.4 The force and Police Authority has also made strides to reduce the number of bases that response officers are briefed from. This reduces management costs and other overheads and avoids duplication and bureaucracy so that we are more efficient.

4.5 Response officers shift patterns were also reviewed and we examined in detail the five shift tidal pattern currently used by response officers and a four shift tidal pattern in which supply closely matched demand. As part of the review, we used a Response Profiler product, supplied by Process Evolution, which provided a structured approach to calculating resource requirements and offered a significant opportunity for evidence-based decision making regarding demand. The review noted significant differences when LPTs were examined individually and officer utilisation rates varied considerably. It concluded the current five shift tidal pattern provided a good supply/demand match at all times of the day, ensured officer welfare is taken into account and provided reasonable case continuity and visibility. However, the full benefits of the five shift tidal pattern can only be realised through streamlined supervision and single crewed cars to improve our flexibility and ability to respond.

4.6 In time, the force and Police Authority aim to continue the drive to balancing supervisory officer ratios. This will be done by recognising national averages and regional averages as a benchmark.



4.7 The force and Police Authority have streamlined and centralised business support functions to become more efficient, reduce duplication and cost as well as ensure LPTs are focused on delivering robust policing to their communities.

#### 5. IMPROVING THE WAY WE INVESTIGATE CRIME

5.1 The force restructuring led to the creation of a new Investigative Services Department, which will improve the way we investigate more serious and major crime.

5.2 One of the biggest changes is increased investment in the key strategic area of protecting vulnerable people. Our new Protecting Vulnerable People Department will deal with criminals who target the most vulnerable members of the community. This area is a major challenge for the force and partners and a multi-agency approach is essential. At a time of budget reduction we have safeguarded resources in priority areas.

5.3 To support this, the creation of a county-level Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) will ensure joined-up service responses and close partnership working. Due to be implemented later this year, the hub will see Staffordshire Police being co-located with Social Services, The Health Service, Local Authorities and voluntary organisations to closely assess risk and protect the most vulnerable people in our communities.

5.4 Child protection and vulnerable adult teams are working together more closely and the restructuring has seen the force form a dedicated adult protection team which focuses on solving key issues such as serious sexual assaults.

5.5 Reactive and proactive investigation teams have been grouped into three operational hubs based geographically across the force—leading to a streamlined management approach and focused delivery for those who are victims of crime.

5.6 Against a strategic risk assessment, the Major Investigation Team has been streamlined and is central to the Strategic Investigation hub.

5.7 Intelligence and analytical services have been combined through the creation of a 24/7 real-time intelligence service. The team provides real-time support for the management of threat and risk to both individuals and the force. The resource is closely aligned to intelligence officers within the northern, southern and central hubs to ensure a streamlined approach to intelligence.

5.8 Integrated Offender Management (IOM) has been developed to deliver joined-up approaches to managing offenders with our partners in the areas covered by the LPTs.

5.9 Additionally, the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) and the Forensic 21 team have been engaged in the transformation of forensic service delivery in the county. The significant restructuring of this department is still ongoing.

#### 6. SUPPORTING OUR NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING SERVICES

6.1 As part of the restructuring, the force and Police Authority agreed the creation of Operational Services; an innovative group which combines Justice Services, Operational Communications, Tactical Operations; involving firearms and roads policing, and a newly-formed Operational Cadre as one cohesive unit.

6.2 Management structures within Operational Services have been streamlined to reduce costs and ensure resilience.

6.3 A streamlined Justice Services Department now further supports operational policing by providing a range of services to witnesses and victims of crime. Through restructuring, the department is working closely with other criminal justice partners in Staffordshire, particularly the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), and is specifically looking at workforce modernisation proposals. Regional work in this area is also expected to be investigated in the near future.

6.4 The Operational Communications Department has developed an integrated switchboard and operational control room. Multi-skilled staff within the department provide a more robust, responsive service to our communities.

6.5 Tactical Operations approaches throughout the region have been made more efficient in order to support collaborative plans on all Operational Support areas such as firearms, public order and collision investigation. The plans will use the CMPG model as best practice. Additionally, firearms administration has been transformed ensuring a risk assessed and intelligence-led service provision

6.6 A 24/7 Operational Cadre has been developed to provide essential operational command through high quality trained leadership within serious and critical incident management. This has led to the reduction of on-call in favour of on-duty management and meant reduced costs to the force.

6.7 Resourcing has been removed from local commanders and is now the responsibility of a newly introduced Corporate Resourcing Unit. Its aim is to drive the process of delivering essential staffing cover and the planning of major and sporting events. This is particularly beneficial in terms of the commitment of the force and Police Authority to the 2012 Olympics.

## 7. STREAMLINING OUR BUSINESS SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

7.1 The force and Police Authority has streamlined business support functions such as finance, human resources and information technology to become more efficient. We have also reduced management levels to ensure we put as much of our budget into frontline policing as possible.

7.2 Management numbers have been reduced from six to two within the Corporate Communications area of our business. This has enabled us to invest in officer and assistant grade posts while still making budget savings of 21%. The streamlined structure enables us to deliver effective, innovative and measurable communication and PR activities. It fosters a more coordinated and corporate approach to communication with team members based together, reducing duplication of effort and opportunity costs.

7.3 Our business support functions have been merged into three distinct organisational support areas to drive centralised services to the new business areas of the force.

7.4 Business processes have been redesigned in critical areas such as the management of calls for service, incidents, crimes and the custody and justice process and the force continues to look at how we can streamline our business approaches.

7.5 Additionally, the force now has a focused approach to business change and benefits management. Reporting directly to the Deputy Chief Constable, a dedicated Benefits Realisation Team will have responsibility for the delivery of day-to-day benefit management and supporting the new business areas to reduce risk. The new role, which negates the need to draw large teams from elsewhere in the force, are critical to ensuring that benefits anticipated from change are realised.

7.6 Service delivery within organisational support has been modernized—with further use of self service through the implementation of an integrated human resource, resource management and finance system.

7.7 Mobile data is continuing to be a focus for the force. Rolled out in 2008, the PDA gives officers access to Police National Computer (PNC), Electoral Rolls, Warrants, the crime management system and the command and control system. Future work will focus on officers being able to access intelligence, Stop and Search and evidential image capture—enabling officers to spend more time with their communities, dealing with the things that matter to them.

7.8 Collaborative opportunities with partners in the county are being pursued. Notably, the Occupational Health Safety and Welfare Unit will work to provide a full range of Occupational Health support to Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service.

*June 2011*

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### Written evidence submitted by Airwave

The oral evidence session on 17 May looked at procurement issues and specifically mentioned Airwave. Airwave would therefore like to submit written evidence to the Committee to contextualise its position as a government supplier and provide further relevant background information.

#### BACKGROUND

Airwave built and runs the dedicated communications network for the police, fire and ambulance services and other organisations that provide vital public services. The Airwave Network and the people who manage it ensure that the emergency services have secure access to the specialist communications they need to manage major incidents, maintain public safety and save lives.

In 2000, Airwave won a competitive pitch to design, build and operate the communications network for police forces across England and Wales. Airwave has worked collaboratively with the emergency services to develop a long-lasting network to give security, resilience and interoperability so that different organisations can communicate seamlessly with each other.

In 2001 Lancashire Constabulary became the first police force to use the Airwave Network operationally with a further 10 police forces going live on the network in 2003. In 2005 the network was completed giving 100% population coverage and 99.9% geographical coverage across Britain.

#### AIRWAVE SOLUTIONS LIMITED

Airwave Solutions Limited was borne from the need for a common national communications platform for all the UK's emergency services and established as a private finance initiative (PFI) commissioned by the Home Office on behalf of the police. The Airwave Service is part of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) Critical National Infrastructure and is designed to stay working during major incidents. Conventional mobile GSM and fixed telephony networks have, in the past, overloaded or failed.

To date Airwave has invested £1.3 billion in designing, building and maintaining the Network, completed on time and on budget according to the terms of the contract. Governed by these terms, Airwave stands to

make a return of 8% by the end of the contract (around five years' time or longer according to when the police force signed up). Currently, Airwave and its shareholders Macquarie are £300 million in debt and continue to pay for the build of this globally unique network.

Airwave Solutions Ltd employs 750 people across the UK and has international offices in Germany and Australia.

#### GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT

A competitive pitch process to develop a communications network for police forces across England and Wales was held in 2000. From an initial 70 companies which expressed an interest in the project, three consortia were formed and passed a pre-tender assessment process. Following the withdrawal of other the other consortia on the grounds of lacking appropriate technical expertise, Airwave, then part of O<sub>2</sub>, was chosen to provide the service.

Airwave was chosen to provide communications services to ambulance trusts in 2005. In 2006 Airwave was then chosen to work with Fire & Rescue Services—meaning that for the first time all three blue lamp services were able to communicate on the same system.

In November 2009 a change to the Police contract was agreed with the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) for the enhancement of Network Services to meet the demand and requirements of the emergency services during the London 2012 Olympic Games.

#### INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability—the ease with which the separate emergency services and the separate forces within them can work together—is vital to allowing efficient responses to serious incidents.

Before the completion of the Airwave Network, numerous standalone networks were used across the country. These local solutions meant that communications between the services were difficult, hindering joint working in cases which crossed force boundaries or required more than one emergency service.

By providing a single national critical communications system, Airwave allows communication and thus co-operation between all members of the emergency services.

#### LONDON UNDERGROUND

At the time of the London bombings on 7 July 2005, Airwave was not contracted to provide coverage in the London Underground tunnels, and the service was not yet in routine use by most Metropolitan Police offices. However, Airwave provided additional handsets to emergency responders to allow them to improve communications on the day, and Airwave staff entered the incident sites to provide temporary coverage in the tunnels.

Following the bombings, the Airwave service was contracted by Transport for London in 2007 to deliver secure resilient communications across the London Underground tunnel network. Utilising the existing Connect infrastructure, already in use by the British Transport Police, the project was delivered in October 2008, five months ahead of schedule and at a saving of £400 million.

This means that TETRA digital radio systems now function above and below ground across the capital. As a result, the British Transport Police, Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, London Ambulance Service, the London Fire Brigade and TfL can better co-ordinate their efforts, resulting in improved protection to the travelling public.

*June 2011*

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#### **Written evidence submitted by George and Giulietta Galli-Atkinson**

We have found that the online registration to participate in the e-consultation and poll on policing priorities is unsatisfactory since the areas of police work are vaster than the list provides and equally vital. The rigid tick format of consultation will lead to half baked conclusions of public opinion, if it really matters. More subversively, it will lead to justification to cut funds and/or disbandment “by public decree”, when the sample will hardly be representative of public opinion, especially since forum discussions are censored. Suffice it to say, that we write not wishing to be caused to miss out on this important opportunity to contribute to a consultation whose issues are rather more complicated and cross topic than parliamentary moderation would wish.

Neighbourhood policing is as vital as police response time, as is equipping the police with training and modern technology, as is the ability to investigate or administer investigation. They are interlinked areas often requiring cross input of expertise. This is especially true of road traffic policing which is an integral part of police work but which ought not to be subsumed. These officers are often drawn into areas of policing beyond

their own specificity, from homicide (which deaths by driving are) to alcohol, drugs, robbery and/or terrorism-related incidents etc. Road traffic policing has its own HQ and policing strategy aimed at detecting and investigating road crime, enforcing road law and increasing road safety to reduce fatalities and serious injuries—a huge policing task that while integral ought, at least, to have earned its own tick box.

We became involved in road safety and policing issues following the death of our daughter Livia in 1998. Over the years we have been lucky to hold the support of Enfield borough's Members of Parliament, David Burrowes and Stephen Twigg, who as longstanding panel members of The Livia Award for Professionalism and Service to Justice (an award instituted to encourage and highlight outstanding road crash investigation and family liaison police work), can, hopefully, vouch for our sanity and constructiveness. We campaign where we hope we can be useful. This public consultation on policing priorities and where, within that, road traffic policing and safety should stand, goes to the very heart of our interest.

Road fatalities and serious injuries are not acceptable collateral damage and are the major cause of death amongst the young between the ages of 16–25. This is repeated so often, it risks becoming a cliché. The UN agrees that bad driving is the major cause of death of our young, even worldwide, and that no amount of complacency is apt given that global driving populations are set to increase, on the move across boundaries and casualties not set to decrease. The UN also acknowledges the costly trauma to nations' economies that victims or victim's families engender, in the aftermath of violent death or heavy maiming.

The 40% cut to the policing budget, therefore, massively affecting road traffic policing and associated safety projects (even spread over two years), has been unwise and will be damaging, squandering the investment and causing chaos, amongst others:

- enforced early retirement of specialists;
- shrinkage of manpower and expertise;
- increase of workload;
- redeployment;
- recall of the retired for lack of expertise;
- car patrols almost invisible or increasingly reactive rather than proactive;
- speed cameras, proven to save lives, deactivated with immediate negative consequences;
- speed limits on motorways set to rise from 70 mph to 80 mph meaning that the charging point, currently at 10% + 2, will allow motorists to travel at 90 mph before being stopped, if patrols are available;
- 20 mph zones discretionary, when they should be mandatory, particularly around schools;
- increased pressure on Councils to spend slashed budgets to disassemble the assembled-protective railings, humps, traffic lights; to level down pavements by removing the kerbs to facilitate the bucolic visions of space sharing between pedestrians, cyclists and mechanically propelled vehicles that will cause more risk to pedestrians, particularly to the young and infirm; and
- education projects cropped.

All this, and more, added to declarations that jail doesn't work, infers an administration more attuned, indeed, to ending that war on motorists, rather than to ending the scandal of complacency begun by the Transport Committee 2007–08.

Changing attitudes requires consistency: consistent political leadership, apolitical commitment and key departments' strategic cohesion. Progress has been made over the last decade, most of it victim-led, but the reduction in road fatalities has been no less due to better enforcement and empowerment of road police officers.

So that it is very disappointing that despite the emphasis of the Home Office that road traffic policing is core police work, it is not a policing priority that the public has been able to opt for in this consultation. To this end, we hope that the Committee will consider our submission useful and register our policing priority where we desire investment to be sustained: in road traffic policing.

*June 2011*

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#### **Written evidence submitted by Philip Saunders**

I attended your recent committee session on the New Landscape of Policing and noted your interest in police force procurement arrangements. This letter expands on some of the points raised in committee.

The City Corporation's interest in this subject stems from its role as police authority for the City of London police area.

Currently, the Regulations, which require police forces to procure in accordance with specific framework agreements, cover items such as police vehicles, body armour and some IT hardware and software. As you

heard, there are indications that the Home Office intends to expand these categories to include some 500 categories of items of police expenditure.

Standardising the equipment or services to be procured, and even dictating the suppliers of choice, may be critical if the purpose is to ensure inter-operability between forces in certain areas of policing activity. This is particularly true for equipment and services which require a high level of specificity, such as police radio communication or forensics services. Extending these requirements to more general types of equipment and services could, however, have unintended and rather wider negative effects. For example, it could disproportionately affect small and medium enterprises, which generally find it difficult to compete with larger companies both in terms of pricing and access to clients in the public sector. It could also come into conflict with initiatives to promote local procurement. Also, if the Government's intention is devolve greater responsibility to local policing bodies for securing value for money for their communities, it may be that locking forces into mandated framework agreements covering wide areas of expenditure will take away local decision-making in favour of centralised arrangements. Furthermore, many innovative arrangements which forces may have with other public bodies (for example, sharing resources such as premises with local authorities or NHS trusts, etc) may be compromised.

On flexibility under the regulations, it is clear, from the wording of the equipment and the services regulations (currently in draft) that no flexibility exists. The words of the statutory instruments require that where a category of equipment or services falls within the scope of a mandated framework agreement, forces will simply not be permitted to contract with suppliers other than those listed in the relevant framework agreement—preventing forces from using equipment or services that may be sourced at a lower cost—or perhaps even free of charge.

In the City's case, the Corporation currently provides a variety of services to the City of London Police as part of an integrated arrangement that ensures minimum costs for those services to the Force. Examples of these include legal, insurance and some transactional finance services. Similarly, the City has been able to carry out joint procurement exercises with the Police for occupational health, cleaning and energy contracts, bringing cost efficiencies to both organisations—and savings to the public purse.

The City continues to seek Home Office assurances, in the same way that the committee did, that where value for money may be found in arrangements other than within the scope of a framework agreement, then a degree of flexibility is allowed to ensure that forces make the best use of public money. As I mentioned above, the Regulations as currently crafted do not permit any flexibility. Further examination of the wording of the regulations, perhaps in committee, and addressing the issue within the scope of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill may be ways forward.

*June 2011*

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#### **Written evidence submitted by Logica plc**

I am grateful for the opportunity to submit our views to the Committee. As the Committee will be aware Logica is one of the UK's leading IT, business and service technology companies. We employ over 39,000 people worldwide including over 5,000 people in the UK. We provide business consulting, systems integration and outsourcing services to clients around the world, in both public and private sectors. We have a particular interest in the Committee's current inquiry by virtue of our role as the lead supplier in a number of key systems supporting policing in the UK, in particular the Police National Database and the SOCA 2010 programme. We believe that there are real opportunities for improved efficiency and effectiveness in policing following the Government's White Paper, "Policing in the 21st Century", and the focus of our evidence to the Committee will be on how to realise those benefits.

Our interest is, in particular, in business process rather than structure and for that reason we do not think it right to comment on the specific organisational issues arising from the creation of the National Crime Agency currently before the Committee. We will work closely with whatever structures the Home Secretary puts in place: our interest is in the "how" of delivery rather than the "where". We do, however, have a close interest in the pace of the reform programme. We recognise the scale and complexity of the changes and that some of them require legislation which is now before Parliament and we welcome the clarity which the Home Secretary's statement on 8 June brought. However, nearly a year on from the publication of the White Paper, it is still not clear where the essential functions performed by the NPIA, including those relating to the critical national infrastructure, will migrate to and when. Moreover, the long transition period and the fact that the reform agenda is being run as a series of linked initiatives rather than as a major programme in the normal sense of the word has led to a lack of clarity and coherence in certain areas.

From the Logica perspective this is frustrating. We believe that we have an important part to play in the delivery of the efficiency and effectiveness benefits envisaged by the White Paper—in other words "better for less"—and we wish to engage more fully with government to do so. Securing greater engagement is problematic given the lack of real clarity on who is driving the White Paper agenda particularly on IT: is it the NPIA, the Home Office policy area (Crime and Policing Group), Home Office procurement, ACPO, the Cabinet Office or indeed Individual Chief Constables? It is difficult to have the kind of strategic conversations we need with such a widely distributed group of stakeholders.

It is all the more frustrating because the more efficient and effective delivery of ICT is clearly critical to the Home Secretary's reform agenda. The White Paper itself calls for (para 4.14) "better collaboration between forces to save money on back office and operational support functions and tackle serious and cross-boundary criminality more effectively". Further in para 4.19, it urges "more collaboration across a range of operational and back office support functions for which it is neither sensible nor affordable to adopt 43 different approaches". To emphasise the Government's commitment the White Paper (para 4.51) indicates that it is prepared to legislate, inter alia, "to drive convergence of IT systems."

Given our responsibility for two of the major police IT systems in PND, which is being formally launched on 23 June, and SOCA 2010, we see the potential here for significant savings over and above the £200 million by 2014 to which the ISIS programme was already committed. We also see opportunities for Improved effectiveness at a time when police forces need to focus a higher proportion of their reduced resources on operational policing. The imperative for greater pace in the reform programme to realise these benefits is clear.

For this reason we believe that it is vital that the procurement of the national policing IT infrastructure (such as PND, ANPR, indent, VISOR etc) should remain brigaded together. We believe that the private sector in general—clearly including Logica—has an important part to play in advising on the optimum solution and on its implementation. Our view is that private sector expertise has been significantly under-utilised in the process to date. For our part we stand ready—as we are sure do other suppliers—to work with government more fully to exploit the potential for maximising the functionality of current IT platforms and linkages between systems at very low cost. One area with significant potential for improving efficiency and effectiveness, for example, might be a single national disclosure service to replace the existing system whereby the CRB receives data to Inform Its decisions from all 43 police forces and we would be happy to discuss this with the Committee.

We see this approach as entirely in line with the thinking set out in the White Paper. The issue is not one of policy, it is one of clear identification of roles and responsibilities in taking forward the Government's agenda and of the pace of implementation.

As a company which works closely with the police at all levels, we are very conscious of the need for balance between the responsibilities of the Home Office, the future National Crime Agency, ACPO and Chief Constables. We see the optimum model for the future as a single central organisation responsible for the procurement of essential national systems, with local forces buying into those systems. Local forces could pay extra for add-ons required for particular local operational requirements and procure separately any small systems needed to address truly local functions. Such a model would in our view best deliver the efficiency and effectiveness benefits sought by the White Paper.

We recognise that this may not be achievable in the short term and we are happy to work with whatever arrangements Government puts in place. We do however strongly urge that decisions on the precise role of the NCA are reached as soon as possible; that there is greater clarity on the leadership of the reform agenda particularly as it relates to procurement; and that there is a much more systematic dialogue with the private sector on how to exploit the full potential of existing IT frameworks and the linkages between them.

We would be very keen to explore these ideas further with the Committee if they were agreeable.

*June 2011*

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#### **Written evidence submitted by Trevor Davies**

I am a Police Officer with West Midlands Police with 26 and half years service and my collar number is 4276. My current role is an Offender Manager based at Sutton Coldfield Police Station. I am a plain clothed officer and my role requires me to work varied shifts between the hours of 7.00 am and 11.00 pm.

I am responsible for the management and monitoring of over 100 nominal's who are either Prolific and Priority Offenders, High Crime Causer User and Deter Young Offenders.

This involves close liaison with partner agencies that include West Midlands Probation Service, Youth Offending Teams, Drug Treatment Services, Housing Providers, Employment and Training Groups and The Prison Service to name but a few.

The aim of the Offender Management Team is to assist in the rehabilitation and resettlement of what are classed as some of the most dangerous individuals within Sutton Coldfield Police Area. This includes people with severe drug issues, mental health problems and career criminals. Unfortunately not all of the nominal's respond to the help and assistance provided and for a number of reasons continue to offend.

I work on the Catch and Convict part of the team and as the title suggests one of my main tasks is to track down, arrest and prepare the necessary court papers in an effort to obtain a successful prosecution and protect the community.

As you can imagine the majority of people who have committed further offences, or who are wanted for recall to prison do not want to be arrested and will go to great lengths to avoid apprehension. This often includes resisting arrest!

The Offender Management Team is made up of experienced officers who do not respond to day to day calls made by the public and are independent from the response officers. However in an effort to protect our communities we as a team daily put our safety at risk facing violent offenders with their individual problems.

The Winsor Report suggests that my role does not meet the criteria of a “front line” officer and as such I would lose money from my pay for a variety of reasons. I challenge that my role is less demanding than that of my colleagues who are on response, public order or detective duties and therefore I should be forced to take a pay cut of some £4,000.

The Winsor report is both divisive and insulting to all Police Officers. I would ask that you use me as an example to the Government to show how ill informed the recommendations of the Winsor Report are and the lack of thought that has gone into defining the role of a Police Officer.

I will gladly take part in any discussion with the Government but will not stand by and watch as the best Police Service in the world is decimated.

June 2011

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## Written evidence submitted by South Wales against Wrongful Conviction

### 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 South Wales against Wrongful Conviction (formerly South Wales Liberty) is a voluntary group that has been supporting victims of miscarriages of justice and their families since 1994. We have supported a number of high profile cases that have eventually been overturned at Appeal including the Cardiff Newsagent Three, Jonathan Jones, the Merthyr Three and Mahmood Mattan as well as giving advice and support to many others and continuing to support long running current campaigns. The Group is wholly independent but has in recent years developed close links with Cardiff Law School Innocence Project. A Committee of students from the Innocence Project give practical support to the group; this provides an educational experience for the students who in turn contribute ideas, skills and enthusiasm to assist the group.

1.2 We have become aware of the consultation process for the New Landscape of Policing at a late stage. Consequently we appreciate that the suggestions below are somewhat under developed. They provide some general concerns rather than specific suggestions for action but we hope that they will alert the Home Affairs Committee to some fundamental concerns in the area of policing from the perspective of preventing and rectifying miscarriages of justice. We are happy to endeavour to respond in more detail if the Committee wishes to request this on any of the matters raised. We are grateful for the Committee’s attention to this brief document.

### 2. INVESTIGATION OBJECTIVITY

2.1 It has been suggested to us by a policing expert with whom we work closely that one of the problems that can lead to “modern” miscarriages of justice is reflected in the change in the way investigations take place. He suggests that all investigative agencies should adopt a system compatible with the original version of MIRSAP (Major Incident Room Standard Administrative Procedures) adopted in 1982 following the “Yorkshire Ripper” Investigation. He suggests that over recent years, particularly since 2005 the police have moved away from the basic premise of MIRSAP—that of an open search for truth where all reasonable avenues are investigated, towards a process of building a case against an individual based on proving a hypothesis. Within this approach he suggests that there is a growing acceptance that it is only necessary to put information onto the HOLMES computer system (the electronic reflection of MIRSAP) when that information supports a prosecution. If this is correct it is a step towards exacerbating the problem that lies behind many miscarriages of justice, including those of more recent times. This problem, where the investigation builds a case around circumstances that are interpreted, sometimes quite unjustifiably, in a way that builds a false picture of guilt, is often referred to as “case construction”. In some cases this process is promoted by the misinterpretation or misrepresentation of a piece of scientific evidence as probative when in fact it is not. The limited value of the scientific evidence is then built upon by the interpretation of circumstances supporting the hypothesis while other equally viable lines of enquiry are sidelined. The essential principle that we support in investigations is reflected in the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996, namely the obligation to investigate all reasonable lines of enquiry. The structure and philosophy of investigation should be an agnostic search for truth, which should avoid the biases of case construction and the potential prejudice of hypothesis.

2.2 One clear example of a practice that became unbalanced and unjust as a result of what appeared to be an over-riding desire to get convictions (based sometimes on fallacious psychological theories) was the “whole new genre of miscarriages of justice” (as the Home affairs Committee itself described it) that arose in relation to often false claims of historical sex abuse against carers and teachers.<sup>31</sup>

2.3 The emphasis on prosecution targets and performance-led policing which has been developing over recent years poses a threat to the principle of ensuring objective investigation which should be aimed entirely

<sup>31</sup> Home Affairs Select Committee (2002) *Report into Investigation and Trial of People Accused of Sexual abuse in Children’s Homes*. London HMSO.

at getting the right conviction and based on the position that no conviction at all is preferable to a wrongful conviction. This principle should in our view underlie the philosophy of any new landscape of policing.

### 3. CULTURE AND TRAINING

3.1 We would urge therefore that a New Landscape of Policing should aim to create a culture of awareness of the dangers of miscarriages of justice within the police (the risks inherent in the nature of witnesses, human memory, scientific interpretation, institutional failings and complexities and an inevitably imperfect legal process). Awareness of these dangers should be inherent in the content of police training and ongoing professional practice. Individuals who have been victims of injustice and organisations that represent them should be given an active role in ongoing police training and development.

### 4. OPENNESS AND DISCLOSURE

4.1 One of the main issues that causes concern in investigations and may play a part in creating miscarriages of justice and certainly hampers the exposure and correction of miscarriages of justice, is the matter of secrecy verses openness. Intelligence-led policing throws up concerns about the handling of informants, public interest immunity and police surveillance. We would urge the Home Affairs Committee to consider this area very carefully in the light of the new National Crime Agency and police investigation generally. The quotation below from the policing expert who advises us illustrates how with the formation of SOCA there might have been a move towards greater secrecy. This might be replicated or increased with any National Crime Agency whose success is measured by conviction rates and which lacks an acute cognisance of the need to ensure accountability and a degree of openness sufficient to protect human rights.

“I attended a seminar with the new Head of SOCA—the former head of MI5. When I asked him what investigative system he intended to use I understood his reply to mean—we are in the business of problem solving; expediency rules. When asked about disclosure I understood his reply to indicate—we intend to employ our own lawyers rather than Counsel and thus prevent defence lawyers from finding out how we do things; expediency followed by a failure to comply with the law on disclosure”.

4.2 Working on cases where there has potentially been a miscarriage of justice one is usually faced with an extreme reluctance on the part of the police service to disclose details of the investigation (for example police messages, actions, policy files etc). If these are disclosed to the defence at all prior to trial they are sometimes incomplete. It is often argued that this information is not necessary to disclose as it is part of the investigation and not part of the evidence. However our experience, and that of ex-police officers that have advised us, indicates that it can be very informative in revealing the integrity or otherwise of the investigation and consequently the reliability of the evidence. At the post appeal stage there is a similar reluctance on the part of the police to assist individuals and organisations with obtaining exhibits for expert examination.

4.3 Thus an investigation should ensure that all documents and exhibits are recorded on the HOLMES system and are available to the defence pre-trial and to any convicted individual and their representatives post trial.

4.4 The police should not feel the need to employ specialist lawyers to prevent access to information and openness in the way that currently seems to be the case.

### 5 AUDIT AND MONITORING

5.1 The relationship of the police to the forensic science service is one that also requires close consideration (especially with current changes taking place regarding the Forensic Science Service). There is a need for close scrutiny and monitoring to ensure that scientific work is undertaken independently and objectively especially in an atmosphere of increasing commercial imperatives. As with details of investigations there is a need for openness and rules of operation that ensure pre and post trial disclosure of expert reports and sometimes the detailed tests results on which those reports are based.

5.2 Monitoring systems for all aspects of intelligence-led and covert policing (including the use of Public Interest Immunity) should be reviewed and greater effectiveness sought in protecting from the dangers inherent in this type of policing (this is of course a very topical issue in the light of recent revelations about the payment of police officers by journalists and the concealing of this practice within informant handling arrangements). All police forces and The National Crime Agency will no doubt need to operate covert methods but it is important from the outset that safeguards and audit procedures are maximised to prevent to erosion of human rights through excessive secrecy. Bodies undertaking monitoring and review should be adequately resourced with extensive knowledge of the systems they are monitoring and a commitment to maximising openness and transparency wherever this does not genuinely compromise public safety.

5.3 The New Landscape of Policing might present at a crossroads between a crime control emphasis leading to greater secrecy and unaccountable police power or alternatively a move towards greater openness, objectivity and recognition of the importance of the role of the police service in preserving the human rights of all citizens.



5.4 We hope that the current trial of police officers involved in the Cardiff Three Case will herald a new era of accountability where police malpractice is suspected.

July 2011

### Written evidence submitted by Ian Liddell-Grainger, MP

1. During the course of written evidence submitted to the Committee by Avon and Somerset Police Authority the following response was offered to question 1.

*What progress has the Government made so far and what further steps should it take in driving: a) more effective procurement in the police service?*

“In terms of ways to make procurement more effective we are happy to share our experiences from a public, private partnership we are engaged in. We are founder members of a Joint Venture partnership (Southwest One Ltd) with two local authorities and IBM, designed to provide modern, co-ordinated and flexible back-office services. This arrangement was entered into in 2008 and the Police Authority is contracted to receive £15 million in procurement savings over the 10 year life. Southwest One are now predicting that they will exceed this target by at least 33%. Bringing private sector procurement expertise, economies of scale and utilising category management plans have been the key to achieving these improvements.”<sup>32</sup>

Parts of this statement are misleading.

The Authority suggests that South West One is “contracted” to receive £15 million in procurement savings over a 10-year period. The contract makes no such promises.

The Authority cites South West One’s prediction of exceeding this sum by “at least 33%”. There is no substantive evidence offered.

The Police Authority’s regularly published data consistently shows real savings considerably smaller—the figures are inflated by predictions.

- In November 2010 the Authority predicted savings of £5.5million.<sup>33</sup>
- In March 2011 the Authority predicted savings of £15 million plus, but admitted that achieved savings were less than £2 million. “Currently savings of £1.264m have been delivered through existing category plans.”<sup>34</sup>
- In June 2011 the Authority revised the sums again claiming that £5 million real savings had been made with a further £16m predicted.<sup>35</sup>

2. On 17 May 2011 Chief Constable Colin Port, who is also a member of the board of South West One, took part in a BBC Radio Bristol phone-in: This is a verbatim transcript:

**Colin Port:** South West One saves us a lot of money. We’re projected to save £15 million over 10 years. It is likely to be £26 million actually. That’s £26 million that isn’t spent by you but actually spent by someone else.

*Caller:* Sorry how do they save money I don’t understand.

**Colin Port:** On procurement, that one of the simple ways we do it. They actually buy stuff at a cheaper rate because they can actually do it because they are part of a big global company IBM.

*Caller:* But do you not pay them quite a high sum for doing that job for you?

**Colin Port:** We pay a unitary rate every year but what we’re getting back is £26 million, or around £26 million.

Mr Port omitted to factor-in the start up costs of South West One. Avon and Somerset Police tried to keep these costs private until 23 June 2011 when it was admitted, in response to a Freedom of Information request, that such costs exceeded £8.3million:

2.(a) Avon and Somerset Police Freedom of Information request Ref: 216/11 23 June 2011.

I write in response to your email request, received by the Avon and Somerset Constabulary on 25 May, concerning your wish for a review of the Constabulary’s response to your request made under the Freedom of Information Act on 23 March 2011.

I have reviewed the response provided. Information was provided in relation to questions two, three and four. As these are not subject of your appeal, I have assumed that these responses were satisfactory, and as such, I have not considered them in this local review.

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/writev/939/nlp12.htm>

<sup>33</sup> See ASPOLA report November 2010.

<sup>34</sup> See ASPOLA report March 2011.

<sup>35</sup> See ASPOLA report June 2011.

I have reviewed the basis for the Refusal Notice and taken account of the grounds for the appeal. I am not satisfied that the Refusal Notice was issued in accordance with the Act and therefore do not uphold the original response.

Question one was: *How much have Avon and Somerset Police paid IBM/South West One for Transformation to date?*

*Answer:* £ 8,393,906

If you feel that the constabulary has failed to meet its obligations under the Freedom of Information Act, you have the right to refer the matter to the Information Commissioner, who may agree to investigate the matter on your behalf.

3. Current actual savings (£5 million) to Avon and Somerset Police from involvement in South West One are thus more than wiped out £8.3 million transformation costs (£8.3 million).

In December 2010—before these figures came to light—Avon and Somerset Police commissioned RSM Tenon to examine value-for-money issues. The consultants expressed doubts about the viability of the Constabulary's arrangement with South West One:

“It would be prudent to continue to monitor the outputs and outcomes that result from the arrangement, and consider all options open to the organisation with regard to shared services. This is particularly pertinent as the context and working environment for the Police and partners has radically altered since the Southwest One agreement was signed, and it would be entirely appropriate to evaluate as part of the transformational journey in the future whether the arrangement is still the best for Avon and Somerset Police. It is noted that the loss of access to partner expertise (including IBM) and the cost of withdrawal would be significant barriers to change here.”<sup>36</sup>

July 2011

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### Written evidence submitted by West Yorkshire Police

Please find below a number of examples which I feel displays some of the best practice Wakefield Division has recently shown. There is more, the list could be endless as we strive to always lead the way for others to follow.

#### OPERATIONS FAREHAM, GRASSLAND, MAINSAIL AND NORTH BAY

Four recent operations. Targeting drug dealers, supply lines and proceeds of crime within communities and the night time economy. By use of community engagement we build an intelligence case which leads to covert tactics effectively dismantling organised crime groups, seizing assets from those who make vast amounts of money enjoying a lavish lifestyle.

#### LICENSING PARTNERSHIP

The Home Office recently visited Wakefield. During the visit Wakefield Police were acclaimed as in the top two enforcement teams in the country. Our staff in partnership are pushing boundaries and leading the way for others to follow.

#### DOOR STEP COMMUNITY MEETINGS

Our Neighbourhood Policing Teams are leading the way with door step community meetings. In a bid to win the hearts of our communities we knock on doors, ask what really matters and put our efforts into making it right.

#### SAFEST DIVISION IN WEST YORKSHIRE

Through effective engagement, visibility and having our staff in the right place, at the right time we are statistically the safest Division in West Yorkshire. To achieve this we manage offenders through a variety of methods from late night / early morning calls to working with our partners in housing, benefits and substance misuse.

#### OPERATION EAGLESCLIFFE—PROTECTING OUR COMMUNITIES FROM HARM

Twice yearly we run operations to arrest our most prolific offenders in the Division for any offence no matter how minor. In November 2010 offenders who would normally make the festive period a misery for our communities were targeted and arrested. We visited over 500 addresses and arrested 149 offenders disposing of 120 offenders positively. The operation will run again this summer.

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<sup>36</sup> See RSM Tenon Report for ASPOLA.

#### ANTI SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR MANAGEMENT

The first division in West Yorkshire to manage repeat callers more effectively using an Anti Social Behaviour Analysis Tool (ASBAT) We have a dedicated anti social behaviour hub which supports a process whereby we identify those most at risk. Partnership interventions are then decided upon reducing risk and harm to those most in need. A recent addition to the ASB hub is two new motorcycles supported by a social housing provider. The bikes will be ridden by Police Officers tackling the anti social use of motorcycles.

#### MEDIA INTERACTIONS

Wakefield Division has close links with local and regional media. With our partners we can demand excellent coverage of news our communities would like to hear improving confidence and satisfaction.

#### IN THE DOCK

Wakefield was successful piloting "In the Dock". Pictures of defendants convicted at court are displayed on our websites showing the communities the actions we have taken and the sentences given at court. Wakefield has also successfully achieved the same for those on anti social behaviour orders.

#### AREA DELIVERY GROUPS

In partnership, Wakefield Police are leading the way with area delivery groups. Aligned to wards and policing areas partners will tackle concerns and problems holistically which are raised by the community at engagement events and forums.

#### COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIPS

As new chair to the CSP, the Police Divisional Commander has restructured and re-focused the partnership meeting, creating key priorities and diagnostic outputs to be monitored.

*June 2011*

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